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EVALUATING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
EXCLUSIONARY RULE:
THE PROBLEM OF POLICE
COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW
William C. Heffernan*
Richard W. Lovely**

How accurate are police officers' beliefs about constitutional
rules of search and seizure? And-given the beliefs officers
entertain about those rules-how often do officers engage in
acts they believe to be prohibited by law?
These questions address issues of central importance for the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule.' The purpose of the
exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court has insisted in recent
opinions, is to deter the police from engaging in illegal
searches and seizures.2 A prerequisite to deterrence, though,
is that police officers know which acts are prohibited.3
Furthermore, while it is often difficult to discover whether a
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draft of this article.
1.
The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The exclusionary rule prohibits the use of evidence in certain trial settings when
that evidence was obtained in violation of a defendant's constitutional or other rights.
For further discussion of the exclusionary rule, see infra notes 21-36 and accompanying text.
2.
See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) ("[Tlhe
[exclusionary] rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and
thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable

searches and seizures

....

").

See also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916

(1984).
3.
See, for example, Jeremy Bentham's comment on the cognitive prerequisite
to deterrence: "Punishmentmust be inefficacious... [w]here the penal provision...
is not conveyed to the notice of the person on whom it is intended to operate, as from
want of due promulgation." J. BENTHAM, Principles of Penal Law, in 1 WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 397 (1843).
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sanction has a positive deterrent effect, 4 one can at least say
that a sanction does not have a deterrent effect to the extent
that police officers engage in conduct they believe to be
prohibited.5
To understand the deterrent effect of the
exclusionary rule with respect to fourth amendment violations,
it is thus essential to ask, first, about police officers' knowledge of the rules of search and seizure and, second, about the
extent to which they engage in behavior they believe to be
prohibited by those rules. We draw on research conducted in
four northeastern police departments to provide answers to
each of these questions.
Part I of this article reviews background matters bearing on
our research-in particular, we discuss the Court's framework
for analyzing exclusion as a deterrent safeguard, the research
questions that need to be raised within that framework, and
the research strategy we adopted in light of the Court's
approach to exclusion. Part II analyzes our findings on police
knowledge of the rules of search and seizure. Part III analyzes our findings on officers' willingness to obey the law. Part
IV evaluates our findings in light of policy questions concerning the exclusionary rule. We consider whether the Court
should retain the exclusionary rule or whether it should
modify the rule by allowing for a "good faith" exception for
officers' mistakes in carrying out searches and seizures. We
conclude that the exclusionary rule is the least undesirable
remedy for nonegregious violations of the fourth amendment
and that a general good faith exception to the rule should not
be adopted.

4.
In asking about deterrence, one is concerned with behavior that would have
occurred but for the existence of a threatened sanction for engaging in it. To show
that a threat has a deterrent effect, one must therefore demonstrate that the
nonoccurrence of behavior is fairly attributable to a threatened sanction. It is by no
means impossible to do this; control and experimental groups can, for example, be
used to investigate the strength of a threatened sanction. It is often difficult,
however, to demonstrate that sanctions such as those contained in penal law have a
deterrent effect, for penal law presents few occasions in which important sanctions
are not threatened. Cf. F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT
IN CRIME CONTROL 249-53 (1973) (discussing difficulties in establishing causal
relations between crime and punishment from nonexperimental research methods).
5.
Crimes committed in a state of feverish emotion provide a good example of
this. As criminologists have long noted, threatened sanctions seem to have a reduced
deterrent effect on crimes such as homicide and assault when they are committed by
emotionally charged individuals. See Andenaes, Deterrence and Specific Offenses, 38
U. CHI. L. REV. 537, 538-39 (1971).
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DETERRING ILLEGAL SEARCHES AND SEIZURES:
SOME PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS

To say that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter
fourth amendment violations is to provide only a general
justification for the rule. Difficult questions arise about the
nature of the rule's relationship to fourth amendment rights,
and further questions arise about how to measure the rule's
strength as a deterrent. In Part I, we first examine the
Court's framework for analyzing exclusionary rule issues. We
then review research questions concerning the exclusionary
rule's efficacy as a deterrent. We conclude with an outline of
the research strategy we followed in investigating the
exclusionary rule's deterrent effect on the police.

A. The DeterrenceRationale for Exclusion

In the long history of the exclusionary rule, the Court at one
time or another has justified the rule as a requirement of the
fourth and fifth amendments,6 of the fourth amendment
standing alone,7 of judicial integrity,' and as a deterrent

6.
See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 303-04 (1921); Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886).
7.
See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1914).
8.
See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960). The dissents of
Justices Brandeis and Holmes in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), are
probably the most famous early discussions of judicial integrity in the exclusionary
rule context. Arguing for the exclusion of illegally seized wiretap evidence, Brandeis
stated:
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall
be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In
a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails
to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.
Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds
contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end
justifies the means-to declare that the Government may commit crimes in
order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its
face.
Id. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Holmes agreed with Brandeis. See id. at 469-70
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
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safeguard against police illegality.9 Each of these justifications
appears in Mapp v. Ohio,"° where in 1961 the Court enforced
the exclusionary rule against the states." In his concurrence
in Mapp, for example, Justice Black contended that the fifth
amendment requires the exclusion of evidence obtained in
violation of the fourth amendment. 2 Justice Clark's opinion
for the Court in Mapp struck a note of cautious agreement
Furthermore, Clark's opinion
with Black's contention. 3
vigorously endorsed the arguments that exclusion is a requirement of the fourth amendment standing alone,' 4 that it is
required for the sake of judicial integrity, 5 and that it must
to deter illegal searches and seizures by the
be employed
16
police.

See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984); United States v.
9.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974).
367 U.S. 643, 646-50 (1961).
10.
11.
See id. at 655. Prior to Mapp, the Court had rejected the argument that the
fourth amendment and the exclusionary rule are applicable to state courts by virtue
of the fourteenth amendment due process clause. In Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S.
78 (1908), the Court rejected a defendant's argument that the fourth and fifth
amendments are applicable to the states under the due process clause. Id. at 110114. In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the Court held that the fourth amendment's "core"-its prohibition against arbitrary intrusions by state agents-is
applicable to the states. Id. at 27-28. However, it also held that the exclusionary
rule is not binding on them. Id. at 28-33.
367 U.S. at 661-66 (Black, J., concurring).
12.
13.
Justice Clark stated:
We find that, as to the Federal Government, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
and, as to the States, the freedom from unconscionable invasions of privacy and
the freedom from convictions based upon coerced confessions do enjoy an
"intimate relation" in their perpetuation of "principles of humanity and civil
liberty which [have] been secured. . . only after years of struggle. . . ." Brain

v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 543-44 (1897). They express "supplementing
phases of the same constitutional purpose-to maintain inviolate large areas
of personal privacy." Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 489-490 (1944).
367 U.S. at 656-57 (footnote omitted).
Justice Clark stated that the Mapp Court was "holding that the exclusionary
14.
rule is an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments .... ." 367
U.S. at 657. It is by virtue of the fourteenth amendment due process clause that the
Mapp Court ruled that the exclusionary rule is binding on state courts. Id. at 655.
The key to this statement is thus Clark's conclusion that the exclusionary rule is an
essential part of the fourth amendment.
Id. at 659. The term "imperative of judicial integrity" was first used in
15.
Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222
(1960). See also supra note 8.
Justice Clark stated:
16.
Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary
rule "is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty [contained
in the fourth amendment] in the only effectively available way-by removing
the incentive to disregard it."
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
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In the decade or so following Mapp, the Court turned to
deterrence alone as a justification for exclusion. 17 Commentators have criticized the Court's reasons for discarding other
justifications;1 8 in fact, one of us has recently contended that
the Court is mistaken in viewing exclusion solely from a
deterrence perspective.1 9 The Court's role as final expositor
of the Constitution2" makes it essential, however, to consider
exclusion in terms of a deterrence framework. We shall thus
confine ourselves to that framework.
Three points, we
suggest, capture the core features of the Court's analysis of
exclusion in the post-Mapp era.
1. The Remedy of Exclusion Is Distinct from the Rights
Guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment-The foundational
claim in the Court's analysis is that exclusion is not a right
but instead is a remedy the judiciary has created in responding to violations of fourth amendment rights.2 1 The fourth
amendment recognizes a right to be free of unreasonable
searches and seizures.22 It also recognizes cognate rights to
be subjected only to warrants that are based on probable
17.
The first step toward narrowing the justifications for exclusion was taken by
Justice Clark himself in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). In Linkletter, the
Court was confronted with the question of whether to make Mapp retroactive to state
court convictions obtained prior to the Mapp decision. See id. at 619-20. In ruling
against retroactivity, Clark concentrated on a deterrence rationale for the
exclusionary rule, a rationale that has to do only with discouraging future illegality.
See id. at 637.
During the 1970s and 1980s, the Court has concentrated on exclusion as a
deterrent to police illegality. See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347-49 (1987); United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906, 916-17 (1984); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,
447-59 (1976); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975); United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974).
18.
See, e.g., Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a
"PrincipledBasis" Rather than an "EmpiricalProposition"?,16 CREIGHTON L. REV.
565, 627-45 (1983); White, Forgotten Points in the "ExclusionaryRule" Debate, 81
MICH. L. REV. 1273, 1281-83 (1983).
19.
See Heffernan, On Justifying Fourth Amendment Exclusion, 1989 WIS. L.
REV. 1193, 1241-54.
20.
Under Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-80 (1803), the Court
is the final expositor of the meaning of the Constitution. See also Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("We are not final because we are
infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.").
21.
In United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), the Court stated that the
exclusionary rule operates as "a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a
personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved." Id. at 348; see also United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (quoting Calandra).
22.
The first clause of the fourth amendment states that "[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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cause, specific in nature, and based on oath or affirmation.2 3
Exclusion, the Court points out, is not within the menu of
rights guaranteed by the fourth amendment.2 4 Rather, the
Court views exclusion as a remedy that is made available to
defendants after the government has violated their fourth
amendment rights. 2' According to the Court, exclusion is
temporally and analytically distinct from fourth amendment
26
rights themselves.
2. The ExclusionaryRemedy Exists to Deter Future Wrongs,
Not to Redress Past Ones-It is possible to conceive of exclusion as a remedy for the government's violation of a criminal
defendant's fourth amendment rights. 27 The Court, however,
insists that "the exclusionary rule is neither intended nor able
to 'cure the invasion of [a] defendant's rights which he has
already suffered.'" 2' The Court therefore conceives of exclusion solely as a remedy that discourages future wrongs
through its deterrent effect on the police.29 Under this
analysis, exclusion stands as a windfall benefit for a criminal
defendant at trial. The intended beneficiary of exclusion is the

23.
The second clause of the fourth amendment states that "no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST.
amend. IV. One could read this clause independently of the amendment's first clause,
in which case it would be interpreted as setting preconditions for how but not when
to obtain a warrant. The Court, however, has consistently read the amendment's
warrant clause in light of the reasonableness clause, thus requiring the government
to obtain a warrant in order to demonstrate the reasonableness of an intrusion. See
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) ("When the right of privacy must
reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer
24.
See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (stating that '[t]he
Fourth Amendment contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence
obtained in violation of its commands ....

).

25.
"The wrong condemned by the Amendment is 'fully accomplished' by the
unlawful search or seizure itself ... ." Id. (quoting Calandra,414 U.S. at 354).
26.
Id. at 905-06. For a general analysis of the Court's current approach to
exclusion, see Heffernan, supra note 19, at 1195-1206.
27.
This line of reasoning classifies exclusion as part of an arsenal of curative
remedies, including money damages and return of property, that are available to
victims of fourth amendment wrongs. See Schroeder, Restoring The Status Quo Ante:
The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule as a CompensatoryDevice, 51 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 633, 653-62 (1983).
28.
Leon, 468 U.S. at 906 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540 (1976)
(White, J., dissenting)).
29.
This analysis of exclusion is consistent with the claim that it is a deterrent
remedy. The function of deterrence is the prevention of future harm, not the
rectification of past harm.
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public at large, which is supposed to gain from the
exclusionary rule by virtue of the disincentive it provides for
police illegality.3 °
3. The ExclusionaryRemedy Is Not Required by the Constitution-Points 1 and 2, above, are compatible with the claim
that the fourth amendment requires the adoption of exclusion
as a deterrent against police illegality. 31 Recent Supreme
Court opinions concerning the exclusionary rule make it clear,
however, that the Court does not think that the fourth amendment requires the adoption of exclusion as a deterrent safeguard. The Court, for example, has dispensed with exclusion
of illegally seized evidence in grand jury proceedings.3 2
Furthermore, it has dispensed with the exclusionary rule at
trial for two types of "good faith" mistakes by the police: when
officers act on seemingly valid, but in fact defective warrants; 33 and when they make warrantless intrusions on the
basis of seemingly valid statutes later declared to be unconstitutional.3 4 In these situations, the Court has reasoned that,
on the one hand, it is unlikely that imposition of the
exclusionary rule will be much of a deterrent, while, on the
other hand, it is certain that evidence of guilt will be lost
through the rule's operation. 35 As the Court has put it, these
are situations in which the exclusionary rule "cannot pay its
way." 36 The Court thus views exclusion not as a constitutional requirement but as a remedy whose value hinges on its
effectiveness in deterring police illegality.

30.
See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974) (suggesting that
the public at large, rather than the defendant seeking suppression, is the intended
beneficiary of the exclusionary rule).
31.
The Mapp Court, for example, spoke of "[t]he obvious futility of relegating
the Fourth Amendment to the protection of other remedies" besides the exclusionary
rule. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652 (1961). This language suggests that adequate
protection of fourth amendment rights requires an exclusionary rule.
See Calandra,414 U.S. at 349-52.
32.
33.
See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984).
34.
See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1987).
35.
In Leon, for example, the Court concluded that "the marginal or nonexistent
benefits produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance
on a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of
exclusion." 468 U.S. at 922.
36.
Id. at 908 n.6.
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Research Questions About Exclusion's Deterrent Effect

How can one determine exclusion's effectiveness as a deterrent? The best way to assess exclusion's deterrent strength
would be to conduct a comparative study-that is, to compare
the behavior of two groups of police officers, one of which has
been subjected to the threat of suppression while the other has
not. Unfortunately, meaningful comparative study is not
possible.
Controlled comparison is not possible because
exclusion is employed in all jurisdictions."
Retrospective
comparison, although possible, is not meaningful because
records were not carefully kept on matters bearing on police
searches and seizures in jurisdictions that did not use the
exclusionary rule prior to Mapp.3" And finally, cross-national

37.
If the Supreme Court were to dispense with exclusion altogether as a matter
of federal constitutional law, then it might be possible to compare the behavior of
officers in different departments because some state courts have held that exclusion
is a requirement of their state constitutions. See, e.g., State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J.
95, 157, 519 A.2d 820, 856 (1987); People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 422, 488 N.E.2d
451, 455, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630, 634 (1985).
38.
Writing for the Court in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), Justice
Blackmun stated that "[r]ecord-keeping before Mapp was spotty at best, a fact which
... severely hampers before-and-after studies." Id. at 451-52. This assessment is a
fair one, though it should be noted that many researchers have examined indices on
a before-and-after basis in trying to measure exclusion's effect. Investigators have
considered the following two factors-each of which has proven to be inconclusive:
(1) Warrants. One might view a post-Mapp increase in the issuance of warrants
in jurisdictions that had not employed the exclusionary rule prior to Mapp as
evidence that the rule prompted greater police concern with legality. Michael
Murphy, a former New York City Police Commissioner, has stated that although
police rarely used warrants in New York prior to Mapp, they obtained nearly 18,000
between 1961 and 1965. Murphy, Judicial Review of Police Methods in Law
Enforcement: The Problem of Compliance by PoliceDepartments, 44 TEX. L. REV. 939,
941-42 (1966). In contrast, Bradley Canon reports that in Los Angeles police obtained
only 207 warrants in 1968. Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in FailingHealth? Some
New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 KY. L.J. 681, 709 n.91
(1973-74). Even if an increase in demand for warrants could be taken as evidence of
greater police concern about compliance with the law, one would have to conclude, as
did the author of a student note, that the "increase in warrants [in some jurisdictions]
seems to [have been] conditioned on a variety of local factors that mediated the
impact of Mapp." Critique, On the Limitationsof EmpiricalEvaluationsof the Exclusionary Rule: A Critique of the Spiotto Research and United States v. Calandra, 69
Nw. U.L. REV. 740, 759 (1974).
(2) Arrests. Investigators have also examined arrest statistics in before-and-after
studies to assess the hypothesis that arrest rates might have declined in the
post-Mapp era as officers became more concerned about compliance with the fourth
amendment. In examining Cincinnati arrest statistics (Ohio-quite obviously-not
having employed the exclusionary rule prior to Mapp), Dallin Oaks was unable to
discern a downward trend in post-Mapp arrest rates that could be attributed to
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comparison, although also possible, is not meaningful given
the major differences between American and foreign police.3 9
This makes it necessary to think about exclusion's deterrent
strength without resort to the comparison of groups that have
and have not been subjected to the suppression threat.
Researchers have pursued a number of different lines of
inquiry in this context. Some, for example, have examined the
response of criminal justice agencies to Mapp's imposition of
the exclusionary rule-an organizational issue of considerable
importance, but one that leaves open the question of what
police officers actually do in the field.4" Some have conducted
intensive studies of small groups of officers; the results of
these studies are suggestive but cannot be treated as more
than that, given the small number of officers examined.4 1

imposition of the exclusionary rule. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search
and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 689-91 (1970). Bradley Canon, on the other
hand, found a different trend in the arrest statistics he examined for other cities.
Canon, supra, at 704-06 (describing 'dramatically sudden and truly spectacular"
decreases in arrests in Baltimore, and 'quite noticeable" decreases in Buffalo). Again,
even if arrest trends were a valid criterion for determining whether the post-Mapp
police showed greater concern about the fourth amendment, the empirical evidence
is inconclusive on this point.
39.
As Dallin Oaks has noted, Canadian police have a
tendency to obey the rules [governing search and seizure], irrespective of
sanctions. Toronto police officials, prosecutors and a judge all insisted that
their police are greatly concerned about obeying the rules and very sensitive to
and quick to be influenced by judicial criticism of their conduct. It is doubtful
that comparable United States officials would similarly describe the attitudes
of their police.
Oaks, supra note 38, at 706. Furthermore, as Oaks has pointed out, Canadian police
are subject to the authority of prosecutors, so
if police arrest or search and seizure practices are offensive to a prosecutor, he
has channels available to have them corrected. This is significantly different
from the independent character of most United States prosecutors and police
organizations, neither of which is in a position to bring any direct command
influence on the other.
Id.
40.
For a discussion of police agencies in particular, see Milner, Supreme Court
Effectiveness and the Police Organization,36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 467, 4'75-76
(1971). For a general discussion of criminal justice agencies see Katz, The Supreme
Court and the States: An Inquiry into Mapp v. Ohio in North Carolina. The Model,
the Study, and the Implications, 45 N.C.L. REV. 119 (1966), and Nagel, Testing the
Effects of Excluding Illegally Seized Evidence, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 283.
41.
Studies of small groups of officers have reached conflicting conclusions about
officers' attitudes toward the law and their actual compliance with it. Two
participant-observer studies that have reached pessimistic conclusions are J.
SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL (2d ed. 1975) and J. RUBINSTEIN, CITY POLICE
(1973). Skolnick devoted his attention to detectives on the vice, burglary, robbery,
and homicide squads of the two cities-"Westville" and "Eastville," as he called
them-in which he conducted research. Skolnick, supra, at 23-27, 30-37. Rubinstein
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Still other researchers have examined the percentage of
suppression motions that are granted because of a judicial
determination that the police acted illegally.4 2 The primary
impetus behind this last line of inquiry has been to assess one
of the social costs imposed by the exclusionary rule.4 3 On
this point, the research has been helpful because it has
established that motions to suppress are most commonly
granted in drug and weapons cases because of search and
seizure problems and that less than 3% of all cases are lost

worked with various units of the Philadelphia Police Department. Rubinstein, supra,
at xii. Both authors witnessed many instances of police illegality. See, e.g., Skolnick,
supra, at ch. 7 and Rubinstein, supra, at ch. 6. Each ascribed officers' willingness to
violate the rules of search and seizure to a set of values that, for the police, are more
important than the values associated with the fourth amendment and each claimed
that police superiors are willing to tolerate illegality-at least of a nonbrutal
nature-as part of an efficient, general campaign against crime. See Skolnick, supra,
at 238-39; Rubinstein, supra, at 384-89. Also, each stated that the officers he
observed often viewed the courts in adversarial terms. See Skolnick, supra, at 233;
Rubinstein, supra, at 369.
Other small-group studies have reached more optimistic conclusions. A student
note authored by Myron W. Orfield, Jr. reported the results of a questionnaire and
interviews with 26 Chicago narcotics officers. Note, The Exclusionary Rule and
Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
1016 (1987) (authored by Myron W. Orfield, Jr.). Orfield found little hostility to the
exclusionary rule. See id. at 1051-52. A majority of the officers responding to
Orfield's questionnaire stated that they generally learn why evidence was suppressed
and that their time in court provided a valuable way of learning the law. See id. at
1037-40. Orfield also found that Chicago narcotics officers are subject to a rating
system which, among other things, takes into account the number of times courts
determine that they acted illegally. See id. at 1027-28.
A participant-observer study by Milton Loewenthal also found that officers accept
the exclusionary rule as necessary if the fourth amendment is to have any meaning.
Loewenthal, Evaluating the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 49 UMKC L.
REV. 24, 29 (1981). Loewenthal did not examine the other factors considered by
Orfield. His conclusions, though, are consistent with those of Orfield-in particular,
that officers do not resent the exclusionary rule and that they do not view the courts
as adversaries. See id. at 29-30.
42.
See Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn)About
the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost"
Arrests, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 611; Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 585; Nardulli,
The Societal Costs of the Exclusionary Rule Revisited, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 223
[hereinafter Nardulli II].
43.
In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the Court attributed the
following social costs to the exclusionary rule: (i)some factually guilty defendants
are not convicted, (ii) some factually guilty defendants receive more favorable plea
bargains than they otherwise would, and (iii) indiscriminate application of the
exclusionary rule may generate disrespect for the law. Id. at 907-08. The articles
cited supra at note 42 deal primarily with the first of these costs, although they give
some consideration to the second as well.
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because of the exclusionary rule.44 Such inquiry, however,
provides a less than satisfactory basis for assessing exclusion's
deterrent effect because it does not deal with intrusions that
do not lead to criminal charges.4 5
In searching for another, more helpful way to study
exclusion's effectiveness as a deterrent, it is useful to start
with a general statement of how deterrence operates and then
to identify research questions relevant to exclusion that are
suggested by that statement. A deterrence strategy, we
suggest, operates through the communication to individuals of
a threat of unpleasant consequences if the individuals engage
in one or more prohibited acts.46 By this analysis, there is a
cognitive component to deterrence: In the case of the fourth
amendment, one must ask whether officers are able to identify
what is prohibited under the rules of search and seizure.4 7
Furthermore, our statement of how deterrence operates
focuses attention on the relationship between a threatened
sanction and individual conduct. Although many questions
can be asked about the relationship between sanctions and
conduct, perhaps the most telling one in a fourth amendment
setting has to do with the frequency with which officers
engage in conduct they believe to be illegal.48
A distinction implicit in Justice Frankfurter's analysis of the
fourth amendment provides a useful way of thinking about the
cognitive component of deterrence. In Wolf v. Colorado,4 9
where in 1949 the Court first considered applying the
exclusionary rule to the states, Frankfurter stated that the
core concern of the fourth amendment is "[t]he security of

44.
See Davies, supra note 42, at 680; Nardulli II, supra note 42, at 234.
45.
As Chief Justice Warren noted in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 n.9 (1968),
illegal intrusions can be carried out for harassment purposes. Illegal intrusions can
also occur because of sheer mistake, as when police officers illegally detain dozens of
people in a vain effort to find a perpetrator. In either case, the police would be highly
unlikely to report such intrusions to prosecutors.
46.
See generally F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 4, at 70-74 (discussing
deterrence).
47.
Doubts about the ability of police officers to make assessments of legality
that are routinely correct were raised even before Mapp. See Barrett, Exclusion of
Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches-A Comment on People v. Cahan, 43 CALIF. L.
REV. 565, 590 (1955). In the post-Mapp era, these doubts have also been voiced in
dissenting opinions by Supreme Court justices. See e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 417 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538-39 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
48.
The Court expressed its concern about officers' willingness to comply with the
fourth amendment in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 (1968).
49.
338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police." 50 If
the fourth amendment were solely concerned with arbitrary
intrusions, no serious problem of knowledge would arise with
respect to deterrence. While officers would encounter some
difficulty in determining the outer boundaries of a prohibition
of arbitrary intrusions, they would have no problem
remembering-or, in most instances, applying-so simple a
prohibition on conduct.
It is the less clearly illegal intrusions, not the patently illegal
intrusions, that are likely to present a cognitive barrier to
deterrence. The distinction between two kinds of illegality-one
involving arbitrary state action, the other involving wrongful
but not arbitrary state action-is, as we suggested, implicit in
Frankfurter's characterization of the core of the fourth amendment. 51 If one can say that, at its core, the fourth amendment prohibits arbitrary intrusions on protected interests,
then one must also say that a body of law is arranged around
the amendment's core that offers greater protection than a
simple prohibition of arbitrary intrusions. The Court's fourth
amendment jurisprudence creates a penumbra around the
basic core prohibition of arbitrary intrusions. Most of the
famous Supreme Court fourth amendment cases-Weeks,5 2
Mapp,53 and Bivens,54 for example-have dealt with patently

50.
Id. at 27.
51.
In Wolf, Justice Frankfurter did not state whether he thought the intrusion
at issue in the case involved arbitrary action by state officials. He did, however,
discuss what he considered to be arbitrary action:
The knock at the door, whether by day or by night, as a prelude to a search,
without authority of law but solely on the authority of the police, did not need
the commentary of recent history to be condemned as inconsistent with the
conception of human rights enshrined in the history and the basic constitutional
documents of English-speaking peoples.
Id. at 28. If the knock on the door is, as in Frankfurter's example, based solely on
police authority, there can be no doubt about the arbitrariness of the intrusion that
follows it. However, Frankfurter's example allows for a middle ground, one where
an intrusion is not authorized by law but where it is at least supported by objective
suspicion of wrongdoing. For example, an officer carrying out a warrantless intrusion
into a home might have probable cause to believe there is evidence of a crime but
might mistakenly believe that exigent circumstances justify entry without a warrant.
In knocking on the door and then intruding, the officer cannot be said to be acting
arbitrarily given the predicate of suspicion available to him. However, the officer's
entry into the home is still illegal.
52.
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (involving a warrantless entry
into a home followed by inspection of the homedweller's bureau drawers).
53.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (involving a warrantless entry into a home
followed by a struggle with the homedweller and extensive search of home's contents).
54.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971) (assessing allegation that federal officers entered home without warrant,
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illegal police intrusions. Year in, year out, however, the great
majority of Supreme Court opinions on the fourth amendment
and most lower court fourth amendment cases as well do not
involve patent illegality.5" Rather, they center on questions
having to do with the exact content of rules of search and
seizure that define the 56
outer limits of protection provided by
the fourth amendment.
When expressed this way, it becomes clear that the key
question about the cognitive dimension of deterrence has to do
with officers' knowledge of the fourth amendment's rules of
search and seizure that provide protection beyond the amendment's core prohibition of arbitrary intrusions. In applying
the rules of search and seizure, officers must know when they
have met the constitutional prerequisites for initiating an
intrusion and for escalating one.5 7 They must be able to

arrested head of household and manacled him in front of his family, and searched
entire home).
55.
See, for example, Justice Scalia's comments on the Court's fourth amendment
docket:
We certainly take, on certiorari, a number of Fourth Amendment cases in which
the question seems to me of no more general interest than whether, in this
particular fact situation, pattern 3,445, the search and seizure was reasonable.
It is my inclination-once we have taken the law as far as it can go, once there
is no general principle that will make this particular search valid or invalid,
once there is nothing left to be done but determine from the totality of the
circumstances whether this search and seizure was "reasonable" -to leave that
essentially factual determination to the lower courts. We should take one case
now and then, perhaps, just to establish the margins of tolerable diversity. But
beyond that, just as we tolerate a fair degree of diversity in what juries
determine to be negligence, I think we can tolerate a fair degree of diversity in
what courts determine to be reasonable seizures.
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1186 (1989).
56.
The key twentieth century exclusionary rule cases made it possible for the
Court to consider cases where fourth amendment issues were not so clear-cut. The
exclusionary rule announced in Weeks, for example, paved the way for Supreme Court
consideration of the issue of whether surreptitious entry by a government agent is
permissible under the fourth amendment, see Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298,
305 (1921); whether a search and seizure conducted by a private party is covered by
the fourth amendment, see Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 474-75 (1921); and
whether a warrant is required to search the passenger compartment of a car, see
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149, 153 (1925). The rule announced in Mapp
paved the way for Supreme Court consideration of issues such as stop and frisk, see
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-20 (1968); warrantless arrests in the home, see Payton
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980); and warrantless searches of mobile motor
vehicle homes, see California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-94 (1985).
57.
Investigative stops of citizens are governed by a reasonable suspicion
standard. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22, 27 (1968). However, to justify lengthy
detention of a person or his possessions, the government must be able to show
probable cause. In Terry, the police officer's initial intrusion, which was justifiable
under a reasonable suspicion standard, produced evidence that provided the probable
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distinguish between the different degrees of protection
afforded objects."8 And they also must be able to determine
when a warrant is required for an intrusion and when one is
not. 9 None of these matters involves patent illegality.
Although there is often an internal coherence to the rules of
search and seizure, these rules are frequently not intuitively
obvious but instead have to be mastered in the same way one
masters any other detailed body of knowledge.6" Thus, what
needs to be investigated is the extent of police mastery of the
rules of search and seizure; in particular, attention must be
given to the factors, such as experience and training, that
account for different levels of police knowledge of the law.
The other research question that should be asked about
deterring fourth amendment violations has to do with the
degree to which officers are prepared-despite the prospect of
exclusion-to carry out intrusions they believe to be illegal.
In Mapp, the Court not only stated that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule is to deter police illegality, it also stated that
exclusion achieves its deterrent effect by" 'compel[ling] respect
for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available
way-by removing the incentive to disregard [that guaranty]."' 6 ' Exclusion, however, imposes only an indirect sanction
on police officers.6
It imposes its direct sanction on the

cause for a warrantless arrest. See id. at 27-31. For a case in which an officer's
initial detention on the basis of reasonable suspicion was justifiable but where the
evidence that established probable cause was obtained following the passage of a
reasonable time for a brief intrusion, see United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707-11
(1983).
58.
Homes, for example, receive differing protection depending on whether they
are mobile homes or stationary. Compare California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985)
with United States v. Johnson, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
59.
Absent exigent circumstances or consent, a warrant must be used to arrest
someone in his home, Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586-90 (1980), or to search
a home, Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-15 (1948). See also Illinois v.
Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2797 (1990). By contrast, a warrant is not required to
arrest an individual in a public place. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24
(1976).
60.
The fourth amendment offers varying degrees of protection (sometimes
requiring only reasonable suspicion, sometimes requiring probable cause, and
sometimes requiring probable cause backed by a warrant) for the different interests
(privacy, property, and liberty) with which it is concerned. One cannot point to a
principle or set of principles that accounts for all the rules the Court has established
for searches and seizures.
61.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
62.
Justice Jackson noted the indirectness of exclusion's sanction in his plurality
opinion in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1954). For a general discussion
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state, rather than erring officers, so it is hard to see how
exclusion, standing alone, would be likely to compel respect for
the fourth amendment's guarantees. Because of their concern
with exclusion's indirectness as a sanction, some members of
the Court in the post-Mapp era have argued that exclusion
cannot be expected to have the strength the Mapp Court
attributed to it. In particular, they have contended that
exclusion cannot be expected to function as a deterrent when
intrusions are carried out with no intention of producing
evidence at trial-when, for example, officers aim merely to
harass an individual 3 or when their goal is to obtain information that will enable them to increase their clearance rate
of unsolved cases.64
It is possible to expand on this skeptical view of exclusion's
deterrent strength, for officers may carry out intrusions they
believe to be illegal even when they wish to obtain evidence
for use at trial. This may happen when officers are certain an
intrusion is illegal but plan to commit perjury about the
circumstances that prevailed at its inception.6 5 A less bleak
possibility involves near-certainty about illegality combined
with a now-or-never set of circumstances for an intrusion. In
this latter setting, an officer could be relatively sure about the
illegality of an intrusion but might nonetheless go ahead with
it rather than forego the possibility of obtaining the evidence.
Given this set of facts, exclusion's indirectness as a sanction
would be of critical importance because one would not expect
an officer to risk a direct sanction-civil or criminal liability,
for example, or departmental discipline-when she believes an

of the significance of exclusion as an indirect sanction, see McGowan, Rule-Making
and the Police, 70 MICH. L. REV. 659, 669-74 (1972).
63.
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), Chief Justice Warren offered the
following example of harassment that cannot be deterred by the exclusionary rule:
The police sometimes accost women "in an area known for prostitution as part of a
harassment campaign designed to drive prostitutes away without the considerable
difficulty involved in prosecuting them." Id. at 14 n.9.
64.
See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), where Justice
Blackmun noted studies which argue that "police often view trial and conviction as
a lesser aspect of law enforcement." Id. at 448 n.20 (citing research by Skolnick,
supra note 41; Milner, supra note 40; and Oaks, supra note 38).
65.
The possibility that a substantial percentage of police officers commit perjury
in order to avoid suppression is discussed in Orfield, The Exclusionary Rule in the
Chicago Criminal Courts, 35 U. CHI. L. S. REC. 14 (Spring 1989) and Police Perjury:
An Interview with Martin Garbus, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 363 (1972). See also Note, Effect
ofMapp v. Ohio on Police Search-and-Seizure Practicesin NarcoticsCases, 4 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 87 (1968); Comment, Police Perjury in Narcotics "Dropsy"Cases:
A New Credibility Gap, 60 GEO. L.J. 507 (1971).
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intrusion to be illegal and is not prepared to commit perjury
in testifying about it. If, however, an officer believes exclusion
is the worst sanction that could be applied for a given intrusion, she might nonetheless proceed with the intrusion in the
hope that her assessment of the law is mistaken. 6

C. Details of the Study

Our research addressed the issues just mentioned: officers'
knowledge of constitutional rules of search and seizure and
their willingness to adhere to their understanding of those
rules. The research employed a questionnaire that was
administered to officers in four midsized police departments
located in the Northeast. In addition to the questionnaire, we
conducted interviews with executives and selected members of
each department. Comments made during the course of these
interviews often proved to be helpful in interpreting the
questionnaire's results. The following points highlight specific
concerns that underlay our development and administration
of the questionnaire.
1. A Concern with Settings in Which Officers Act on Their
Own-Fourth amendment compliance issues are most salient,
we believe, when officers must decide on their own whether to
carry out an intrusion. We decided, therefore, to focus solely
on warrantless police intrusions-that is, settings where
officers cannot rely on a warrant's guidance but must instead
rely on their own judgments of legality. The first, and most
important, part of the questionnaire was based on six
Supreme Court opinions dealing with warrantless intrusions
by the police. Table 1 lists the cases used in the questionnaire. As the table makes clear, the cases we used cover a
wide range of warrantless intrusions including a stop and
frisk, the search of containers found in a car trunk, and
intrusion into a home following a hot pursuit.

66.
In the course of discussing the issue of which fourth amendment rules should
be held retroactive, the Court noted the possibility that officers may take "'a let'swait-until-it's-decided approach'" when uncertain about the legality of an intrusion.
United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 561 (1982) (quoting Desist v. United States,
394 U.S. 244, 277 (1969) (Fortas, J., dissenting)). This point is worth bearing in mind
for all intrusions where officers are confronted only with exclusion's indirect sanction
and are uncertain about the law.
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TABLE 1
CASES USED IN THE QUESTIONNAIRE
Case Name

Margin

Issue

1.

Ybarra v. Illinois
444 U.S. 85 (1979)

6-3

warrantless search of an individual
during the course of executing a
search of premises; there was no
basis for suspecting that the individual was armed at the time of the
search

2.

Warden v. Hayden
387 U.S. 294 (1967)

8-1

warrantless search of a home following hot pursuit of a robbery suspect
to that home

3.

Sibron v. New York
392 U.S. 40 (1968)

8-1

warrantless detention and search of
a suspect following an eight-hour
observation of him in the company of
others thought to be drug dealers

4.

United States v. Ross
456 U.S. 798 (1982)

6-3

warrantless search of containers
found within an automobile trunk
following the establishment of probable cause to search the entire vehicle

5.

Hayes v. Florida
470 U.S. 811 (1985)

8-0

warrantless transportation of a suspect to the stationhouse and the
fingerprinting of him on reasonable
suspicion that he had committed a
crime

6.

California v. Carney
471 U.S. 386 (1985)

6-3

warrantless search (backed by probable cause) of a mobile motor vehicle
home

In one department, the first case used had to do with the need for Mirandawarnings:
Orozco v. Texas
394 U.S. 324 (1969)

7-2

interrogation of a suspect while in
police custody at his home

The cases were presented as scenarios in the questionnaire.
Officers were not told that the scenarios were based on
Supreme Court opinions. The language used to describe each
scenario was the exact language that the Court used to
describe the facts in each case. We changed only the names
of the parties to the cases. After each scenario, we asked the
following questions: whether the specific intrusion at issue in
the Court's opinion for the case (an intrusion described in
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behavioral terms, for example, "opening the trunk," "going
underneath the suspect's outer clothing," etc.) seemed to be an
effective way of combatting crime; whether the intrusion
seemed reasonable; whether the officer reading the scenario
would have carried out an intrusion in such a setting; why he
would (or would not) have intruded; whether the officer
reading the scenario believed the intrusion to be lawful; and,
how certain the officer reading the scenario was about his
assessment of the lawfulness of the intrusion. Thus, officers
were asked about their evaluations of legality and about their
willingness to intrude in certain settings. By examining their
answers, we were able to assess officers' knowledge of the law
(i.e., whether they could correctly identify the legal status of
an intrusion). Also, by comparing their answers about their
perceptions of legality with their answers about whether they
actually would carry out the intrusion, we were able to assess
their willingness to obey the law.
In another part of the questionnaire, we presented officers
with multiple choice questions about search and seizure law.
This latter part of the questionnaire dealt only with knowledge of the law. Although the scenario section of the questionnaire reflected the officers' intuitive ability to identify the
lawfulness of an intrusion in a given setting, the multiple
choice section reflected their ability to select, from a choice of
four or five options, the correct formulation of specific rules of
search and seizure. Because some of the questions in the
second part of the questionnaire dealt with issues involved in
the scenarios, it was possible to see whether officers could
identify the correct formulation of the legal rule for an
intrusion they had reviewed in a scenario.
2. A Concern with Settings in Which Exclusion Is the Sole
Likely Penaltyfor Police Illegality-Becausewe wished to assess
exclusion's effect on police conduct, we selected warrantless
intrusion scenarios that describe conduct unlikely to provoke
other sanctions-in particular, criminal6 7 or civil6" liability, or
departmental discipline6 9 -following a finding of illegality.
Sanctions of the kind just mentioned (direct sanctions, as
67.
For the officers we studied (all employees of municipal police forces), criminal
liability was possible under the laws of the state in which they worked and also
under 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1988).
68.
For the officers we studied, civil liability was possible under the common law
principles of the state in which they worked and also under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
69.
Each of the departments in which we conducted research had an internal
disciplinary panel (i.e., a panel without civilian members) that reviewed complaints
against police officers. Sanctions open to the panels ranged from reprimand to
termination of employment.
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distinguished from exclusion's indirect sanction) are most
likely when an intrusion causes grave harm and is patently
illegal." The likelihood of direct sanctions declines as each
of these features of a fourth amendment violation decreases in
urgency. Direct sanctions are thus least likely when an
intrusion involves only modest harm and is not patently
illegal.7 1 The scenarios we used described intrusions in
which citizens did not suffer72substantial harm and the issue
of legality was not clear-cut.
70.
Of the three sanctions mentioned supra at notes 67-69-criminal and civil
liability and departmental discipline-criminal liability and discipline from a
non-civilian panel are likely only when exceedingly grave harm is inflicted by officers.
Judge Newman has argued that "the criminal sanction will never have significance
as a deterrent [because] [p]rosecutors ... need to maintain close working relationships with law enforcement agencies, [and so] are disinclined to charge police officials
with criminal conduct." Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen
the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447,
449-50 (1978). Similarly, Professor Schwartz noted that a conflict of interest
effectively disables the district attorney from prosecuting police: "It could hardly be
otherwise in view of the daily cooperation essential between the police and
prosecutor." Schwartz, ComplaintsAgainst the Police: Experience of the Community
Rights Division ofthe PhiladelphiaDistrictAttorney's Office, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1023,
1024 (1970). Professor Schwartz also observed that internal police investigation of
police conduct tends to place an "[u]nusually [h]eavy [i]nitiative and [b]urden of
[p]roof' on the complainant. Id. at 1028.
On the other hand, tort actions against the police-in particular, tort actions
pursued in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983-have a somewhat better chance of
providing relief for those who have suffered substantially because of police misconduct. In his study of section 1983 litigation conducted in the Central District of
California (which includes Los Angeles), Professor Eisenberg found two cases (out of
212 examined) in which plaintiffs received substantial damages. In one, a number
of Chicano plaintiffs received a total of $33,000 after bringing a lawsuit in which they
alleged that Riverside police officers used unnecessary physical force (including the
use of tear gas) while arresting them without probable cause. In the other, a plaintiff
received $250,000 in a suit alleging that Los Angeles homicide detectives falsely
arrested him and concealed exculpatory evidence. Eisenberg, Section 1983:Doctrinal
Foundationsand an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 529-30, nn.206-09
(1982).
71.
Criminal liability and internal departmental discipline are particularly
unlikely when officers carry out intrusions that involve modest harm and are not
patently illegal, because of the close relationship between prosecutors and law
enforcement agencies, and the heavy burden on complaining witnesses. Supra note
70.
Each of these factors-modest harm and nonpatent illegality-make civil liability
unlikely as well. When the harm caused by an illegal intrusion is modest, the victim
of such an intrusion cannot expect substantial damages, thus making suits unlikely.
Moreover, in some instances where illegality is nonpatent, civil actions can be
expected to be dismissed at the summary judgment stage given the qualified
immunity defense allowed in federal civil rights cases. See, e.g., Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
72.
In two of the illegal intrusion scenarios (those based on Ybarra v. Illinois, 444
U.S. 85 (1979), and Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968)), officers reached into
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To make sure that we were dealing with settings in which
exclusion alone looms as a likely penalty, we showed the
scenarios to the chiefs of each of the departments in which we
administered the questionnaire. We did not tell the chiefs
which intrusions were illegal. They unanimously stated that
they thought it was unlikely that officers in their departments
would be subjected to direct sanctions for engaging in any of
the intrusions.7 3
3. A Concern with Avoiding Unusual Departments in the
Study Sample-Given the American commitment to local
control of law enforcement, there is extraordinary diversity-in
size, quality of training, command functions, etc.-among the
nation's police departments. Because of this diversity, it does
not make sense to think in terms of "representative" police
departments.
It is often wise, however, not to conduct
research in certain types of departments. We sought to avoid
the following types of departments: those that were particularly large or small, those under a court order concerning
hiring or training, those in which officers or executives were
under indictment or subject to public investigation for corruption or brutality, and those with a reputation for tension
between officers and the citizenry.
The departments in which we administered the questionnaire requested anonymity. We can, however, report that each
was located in either New England or one of the middle
Atlantic states, that each had between 125 and 275 sworn
officers, and that each served urban populations ranging from
40,000 to 100,000.7 4 The departments had between 25 and

suspects' pockets and inspected the contents of what they discovered. In the third
(based on Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985)), they arrested someone without
probable cause. None of these intrusions can be said to involve excessive force or a
gross violation of rights protected by the fourth amendment. Furthermore, none of
the intrusions can be characterized as patently illegal, for while officers did not have
enough suspicion to warrant doing what they did, they at least had some particularized suspicion that supported their conduct.
73.
After examining the scenarios, one of the chiefs remarked that they involved
"doing your job" intrusions. Another said, "this is what we're paid to do." Executives
interviewed in each of the departments said they knew of no criminal or civil cases
concerning the type of intrusions reported in the scenarios. Executives in each
department also said they knew of no disciplinary action that had been undertaken
with respect to the type of intrusions reported in the scenarios.
74.
There are several reasons why we selected midsized departments. First, oral
administration of the questionnaire, which we considered essential, could not have
been conducted for a random sample of officers in a large department. Second,
because a random sample of officers was not possible under conditions we considered
essential, the alternative was to administer the questionnaire to as many officers as
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45 officers per 10,000 persons in the community. Nonwhites
comprised 20 to 50% of each city's population. Crime rates for
the four cities were comparable, ranging from about 5500 to
6500 index crimes per 100,000 persons in the community. All
four cities had relatively little population change in the years
preceding administration of the questionnaire. Poverty rates
in the four cities ranged from 10 to 25%. Per capita income
varied from about $10,000 to $20,000 per year.75
Five hundred and forty-seven officers participated in the
survey, representing about 70% of all the officers in the four
departments.
In each department, we administered the
questionnaire during in-service training sessions in classroom
settings. Either a member of the research team or a training
officer for the department read the instrument aloud while the
respondents read along and completed the questionnaire.7 6
In order to assess the extent of police knowledge relative to
that of laypersons and lawyers, we surveyed two other groups.
First, to estimate what laypersons know about search and
seizure issues, we administered the questionnaire to college
students at the start of an introductory course in criminal
justice. Individuals with criminal justice experience were
excluded. Second, to establish an upper ceiling for the knowledge of search and seizure rules an officer can reasonably be
expected to have, we distributed the questionnaire to prosecutors located in one county in a middle Atlantic state and to
public defenders located in one county in a different state in
the same region. About two-thirds of the lawyers completed
and returned the questionnaires.

possible in a department.
Third, we wanted to conduct research in several
departments. For logistical reasons we were limited in the number of times we could
administer the questionnaire (the largest department required ten separate sessions),
so it was necessary to confine our work to midsized departments.
75.
Demographic data are taken from U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, Statistical Abstract of the United States (1989). Crime and police data are
from U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Uniform Crime Reports

for the United States (1989).
76.
Oral administration of the questionnaire was both logistically and
methodologically preferable. As the questionnaire was read aloud, officers followed
along silently and answered each item simultaneously while the oral reader paused.
This minimized any potential effects of variable reading aptitude, and ensured a
higher completion rate of questionnaire items. It also eliminated any incentive to
rush through the instrument to go on break and the distractions of some officers
finishing before others.
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POLICE KNOWLEDGE OF THE RULES OF SEARCH AND
SEIZURE

In order to find out about police knowledge of the rules of
search and seizure, we asked officers, in the questions
following each scenario, whether they considered the intrusion
reported in the scenario lawful or unlawful. We then asked,
in a separate section, which of several options was the correct
formulation of a rule of search and seizure.
These
approaches-the first contextual, the second abstract-offer
two complementary ways of studying knowledge of the law;
each must be taken into account in thinking about police
knowledge of the law. We shall discuss responses to the
scenarios first; after that, we shall turn to responses to the
questions on the proper formulation of the rules of search and
seizure.

TABLE 2
CORRECT IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGALITY OF INTRUSIONS
IN SIX SEARCH AND SEIZURE SCENARIOS

Supreme Court Case
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979)
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967)
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968)
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)
Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985)
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985)
Mean scenarios correct
(n)a

Percentage of Correct Responses
Police
Lawyers
Laypersons
57
55
54
52
78
39
3.4
(463-547)

93
70
87
57
90
43

41
55
67
70
33
42

4.4
(30)

2.9
(58)

The number of officers (n) responding to each scenario varies from 463-547. The
Ybarra scenario was presented to three of the four departments. The n for the other
five scenarios varies due to missing data.
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Police officers as a group performed slightly better than
chance7 7 in assessing the lawfulness of the intrusions described in the scenarios (see Table 2). In only one of the six
scenarios (drawn from Hayes v. Florida8 ) did a substantial
majority of the police correctly evaluate the legality of the
intrusion. In four cases, they did little better than chance; in
the sixth case (drawn from California v. Carney9 ) a substantial majority thought the intrusion illegal when it was legal.
As a group, responding police officers did considerably better
than responding laypersons, with a mean of 3.4 correct cases
or 57% compared with the laypersons' 2.9 cases, or 48%. ° In
contrast, the officers were outperformed by the lawyers, for
whom the mean number of correct responses was 4.4 (73%).
A similar pattern appears for responses to general questions
about the rules of search and seizure, as shown by Table 3. A
maximum score of eight was possible for these questions.
Because each question presented four or five alternative
answers, there was a 20% to 25% chance of selecting the
correct answer by chance. Each group exceeded the chance
rate of response, police officers by 1.8 correct responses and
lawyers by 2.5. The rank order scores, it will be noted, are
similar to those in the scenarios.
Table 3 also contains a combined knowledge score, which
was derived by adding the legal rules score with a weighted
score for the scenarios. The scenario scores were multiplied by
a factor of 1.33 in order to weight them equally with the rules
scores.8 1 This table also presents a correspondence score,
which reflects the extent of agreement in a respondent's
answers to questions asked following the scenarios and those
posed concerning the general rules. Four scenario questions
had an analogue in the general rules questions; for example,
a scenario about the proper scope of a car search had an

77.
For the incident scenarios, for example, which could only be answered legal
or illegal, one would expect to earn a score of 50% by merely guessing the correct
answers. Similarly, in multiple choice items with four items each, one is likely to get
a score of 25% on average simply by guessing.
78.
470 U.S. 811 (1985).
79.
471 U.S. 386 (1985).
80.
Not only was their mean score somewhat higher, but a majority of officers
answered five of the six scenarios correctly whereas the majority of laypersons
answered only three of the six scenarios correctly.
81.
The scores were combined to provide a more reliable measure of knowledge
because the separate scores provided by the scenario and multiple choice sections
were comprised of only six and eight items respectively.
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On only one
analogue in the general rules questions.
issue-involving the predicate required for sustained detention
of a suspect after a brief investigative stop-did more than
half the officers and lawyers answer both kinds of questions
correctly. Confidence about knowledge of the law is warranted
when both kinds of questions are answered correctly; less
confidence is warranted when only one kind is answered
correctly.

TABLE 3
SCORES ON KNOWLEDGE OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW
FOR POLICE, LAWYERS, AND LAYPERSONS'
Dependent Variable

Lawyers

Police

Laypersons

( 0 . 9 )b

3.4
(1.2)

2.9
(1.2)

Mean general search and
seizure legal rules correct
(maximum score = 8)

4.5
(1.5)

3.8
(1.5)

3.0
(1.2)

Combined knowledge score (scenarios + rules)
(maximum score = 16)Y

10.3
(2.3)

8.3
(2.4)

7.0
(2.2)

Correspondence score
(both related rule and scenario correct:
maximum score = 4)

1.7
(0.9)

0.9
(0.7)

0.6
(0.6)

(30)

(460)

(58)

Mean scenarios correct
(maximum score = 6)

(n)
a

4.4

Analysis of variance across the three groups for each of the four scores
revealed that the differences in means scores were statistically significant
(p < .0001). Paired comparisons, using Scheffe's test, revealed significant
differences (p < .05) in the mean scores for all pairwise comparisons (e.g.,
lawyers compared to police).
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Combined and weighted mean score of scenarios plus legal rule items.
Because the maximum score was six for scenarios and eight for legal rules,
the scenarios are weighted in computing the combined score: Combined
score = (1.33 x scenarios correct) + legal rules correct. Discrepancies
between entries in the table and figures arrived at by substituting scores
into the formula result from rounding.

So far, we have considered responding police officers as a
homogeneous group. When their responses to the questionnaire are examined with reference to identifying characteristics of the officers such as assignments, education, and
in-service training, one discovers that some police sub-groups
approach the lawyers' level of knowledge.
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TABLE 4
KNOWLEDGE OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW
AS A FUNCTION OF POLICE CHARACTERISTICS

Mean Scores

Officer Characteristics

na

Case
Scenarios

Legal
Rules

Current Assignment
Patrol
Plain clothes investigation
Other plain clothes
Supervisor
Years in police work
1-2
3-5
6-10
11+
Arrests in past 6 months
0

7.9
8.5
8.8
9.4
7.9
8.2
8.8
8.4
8.1
7.5
8.1
8.2
8.8
8.9

Suppression hearings in past 6 months
0
1
2+
Exposure to law suits
none
possible
actual
Attendance at college
no

yes
Extent of training in criminal procedure
basic
moderate
extensive
Grand mean score
MAXIMUM SCORE POSSIBLE

b

c

Combined
Knowledge
Scoreb

8.5
8.0
8.3
8.4
8.4
8.6
3.2
3.6

3.6
4.0

7.9
8.8

3.4
6

3.8
8

8.3
16

Includes officers from three departments who considered the same set of six
scenarios with no missing data.
Combined score = (1.33 x scenarios correct) + legal rules correct. (See note
c in Table 3).
Plain clothes investigation = anti-crime officers and detectives. Other plain
clothes = community relations and other assignments.
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As is shown in Table 4, an officer's exposure to lawsuits or
suppression hearings did not effect her mean score on case
scenarios, legal rules, or the combined score. In contrast,
some of the other variables did significantly improve knowledge scores. For instance, officers in nonpatrol assignments
demonstrated greater knowledge of the law. This finding is
not surprising because nonpatrol officers make more arrests
than do patrol officers.82 Also, as one might expect, officers
with at least some college education demonstrated greater
knowledge of the law than officers who have not attended
college. College-educated officers are more likely to be both
motivated and selected to pursue extra training than officers
who have not gone beyond high school. Furthermore, college
is likely to help officers develop the analytic skills needed to
understand the rules of search and seizure.

TABLE 5
KNOWLEDGE OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW
AS A FUNCTION OF EXTENT OF TRAINING IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Dependent Variable

Extent of Professional Training in Criminal Procedure
Police
Basic
Special Training
Police
Law Spearman
None
Academy Some Extensive
School Correlation

Incident scenarios
Legal rules score
Combined score

2.9a
3.0
6.9

3.2
3.4
7.7

3.4
3.9
8.5

3.8
4.6
9.6

4.4
4.5
10.3

.27
.32
.38

Correspondence score

0.6

0.7

1.0

1.4

1.7

.31

(n)

(58)

(274)

(178)

(95)

(30)

(635)

a

Entries in the table are mean scores for each of the dependent variables.

b

Slight differences in the means reported above and in Table 4 are a result
of missing data and different n's.
Spearman's correlation (rho) measures the extent of association between
two ranked variables. The score can run from 0.0 for no association to 1.0
for perfect association. The correlations shown above reflect the association
between level of training and knowledge scores. All correlations are
statistically significant (p < .05).

82.
The percentages by assignment for officers who made five or more arrests in
the preceding six months are as follows: patrol, 24%; plain clothes investigators,
63%; other plain clothes officers, 69%; supervisors, 43%.
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TABLE 6
KNOWLEDGE OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW
AS A FUNCTION OF POLICE CHARACTERISTICS
USING MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS'

Dependent Variable: Total Search and Seizure Knowledge Score

Predictor variables
In-Service criminal procedure training:
Extensive
Moderate

Reg ,ression
Coe fficientb

1.33

d

0.40

Some college attendance

0.59'

Assignment:
Supervisor
Plain clothes investigation
Other plain clothes

0.92'
0.47

Number of arrests in past 6 months

0.17'

Years of service

0.08

0.01

Suppression hearings in past 6 months

-(0.23

Exposure to law suits:
Possible
Actual

-(0.02
-(0.02

Constant
R' = .15 (F = 6.7, p = .0001)

(n = 443)
For a brief explanation of multiple regression, see note 84.
Amount each unit increase in the predictor variable contributes to predicted
knowledge score. Coefficients without superscripts are not statistically
significant.
p < .05 (probability that coefficient is not zero).
p < .001 (probability that coefficient is not zero).

The most significant relationship was that between in-service
training and knowledge of the law. As has often been noted,
Mapp led to an expansion in police training programs" 3-an

83.
See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 38, at 941; Sachs, The Exclusionary Rule: A
Prosecutor'sDefense, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1982, at 28, 31.
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expansion that may have influenced police attitudes toward
the law as well as knowledge of it. With Mapp now thirty
years in the past, it is important to note that the amount of
in-service training in search and seizure law was the most
significant of the background characteristics influencing police
knowledge of the law (see Table 6). With extensive training
(defined as four or more law courses beyond basic academy
instruction), officers acquire a degree of knowledge that
approaches that of lawyers (see Table 5). Table 6 indicates
that in-service training makes a greater contribution than any
of the other variables contributing to knowledge of the law. 4
In this respect, at least, the trend that began with Mapp has
been a beneficial one; in-service training in criminal procedure
has been critical in enhancing police knowledge of the rules of
search and seizure.
Helpful as these background factors are in explaining which
officers are likely to be best informed, they pale in comparison
to the fact that even the most knowledgeable officers and
lawyers make a substantial number of mistakes in dealing
with the rules of search and seizure. The implications of this
fact for the Supreme Court's strategy of deterrence are

We examined the relationship between officers' knowledge scores and the
84.
various predictor variables by conducting a multiple regression analysis. Multiple
regression is an elaboration of simple linear regression that attempts to predict the
value of one variable from a set of other predictor variables (the "independent
variables"). It provides an estimate of how much each predictor variable contributes
to the value of the variable being predicted (the "dependent variable"). In Table 6,
the dependent variable is the combined knowledge score of officers. The estimated
contribution for a given predictor variable is reflected by its regression coefficient.
The regression coefficient reflects the unique contribution of that variable holding the
other variables constant. Each coefficient is tested for statistical significance. If a
coefficient is nonsignificant, the variable to which it corresponds is assumed to be
In Table 6, the variables which have
unrelated to the dependent variable.
statistically significant regression coefficients are extensive training, assignment as
a supervisor, college attendance, and number of arrests. The regression coefficients
of these variables can be interpreted as estimates of the number of points on the
16-point search and seizure knowledge scale that they contribute to the knowledge
score. Thus, officers with extensive training are predicted to score 1.3 points higher
on the knowledge scale than officers with only basic academy training. As is
indicated by Table 6, no other officer characteristic contributes as many points to the
predicted knowledge score. The constant (6.9) of the regression model effectively
represents the predicted knowledge score of officers who have none of the characteristics of the variables included in the model. Thus, for example, a patrol officer who
has only basic academy training, has not attended college and has made no arrests
in the past six months would have a predicted knowledge score of 6.9. An officer in
a supervisory assignment, with five or more arrests in the past six months, some
college attendance, and extensive criminal procedure training would have a predicted
score of 10.5, about the actual score for lawyers.
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straightforward. Simply put, the findings indicate that, even
if all police officers were disposed to adhere to the rules of
search and seizure, there would nonetheless be substantial
deviation from those rules as they are presently constituted
because of police mistakes about what they require. Deterrence
works efficiently only when the subjects of deterrence are
relatively certain about what is expected of them. The rules
of search and seizure, however, are sufficiently vague that
even the best-informed officers are routinely mistaken about
what they may and may not do. It is important to note that
we examined search and seizure rules which the Supreme
Court has authoritatively established. Moreover, the rules
bore on exactly the type of activity-the warrantless intrusion-that is central to police work. The fact that even
well-trained officers were so frequently unable to identify and
apply those rules indicates that, as currently formulated, the
complexity of the law imposes a substantial limitation on the
possibility of deterring police illegality.
Would different formulations of the law enhance deterrence?
On the one hand, there is reason to believe that simplified
rules would enhance the possibility of deterrence. On the
other hand, it seems unlikely that the fourth amendment rules
could be simplified enough to enhance deterrence. Consider
first the evidence that rule simplification would enhance
deterrence. In one department, we devoted a scenario to the
fact pattern in Orozco v. Texas, 5 a police interrogation case
that was decided three years after Miranda v. Arizona. 6
Although responses in this department to the fourth amendment scenarios averaged a 53% correct rate, 99% of the
responses to the Orozco scenario were correct. Furthermore,
we included a question in the general rules questions about
the content of the Miranda warnings, and 98% of the officers
were able to identify the required warnings. As Table 7
makes clear, these are dramatically higher scores than the
average ones for the rules of search and seizure. We believe
that the difference can be explained by comparing Miranda's
bright-line rules with the more complex rules established by
the fourth amendment. Officers are called upon to apply a
comprehensive, easy-to-understand body of rules when
conducting interrogations governed by the fifth amendment.

85.
86.

394 U.S. 324 (1969).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).

340

University of Michigan Journalof Law Reform

[VOL.

24:2

The possibility of deterrence is thus not seriously compromised
by the Miranda rules. If equally simple rules governed search
and seizure, the possibility of deterrence would be substantially
enhanced.

TABLE 7
COMPARISON OF POLICE KNOWLEDGE OF
FIFTH AMENDMENT VERSUS FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW

Percentage of
Correct Responses
Fourth amendment scenarios
Fifth amendment scenario

53
99

Fourth amendment legal rules
Fifth amendment legal rules

38
98
(n = 79)Y

The fifth amendment scenario was administered to just one of the four
departments in survey.

7
In Wolf v. Colorado,"
Justice Frankfurter stated that the
core concern of the fourth amendment is to protect individuals
against arbitrary intrusions by the police. 8 It seems likely
that most officers already understand this point, and it seems
likely as well that deterrence would be facilitated if they had
only to consider an arbitrariness threshold when carrying out
intrusions. Frankfurter did not mean to suggest, however,
that arbitrariness is the sole threshold with which the fourth
amendment is concerned. He was suggesting only that the
minimum degree of protection provided by the amendment is
defined by an arbitrariness standard. In most instances, as
Frankfurter would have conceded, constitutional rules of
search and seizure offer protection that exceeds the minimum
offered by a prohibition on arbitrary intrusions.8 9 What is

87.
338 U.S. 25 (1949).
88.
Id. at 27.
89.
Compare Justice Frankfurter's remarks in Wolf with his support for the
conclusion the Court reached one year earlier in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.
10 (1948). In Wolf, Justice Frankfurter stated that the fourth amendment's "core"
concern is "the security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police."
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more, it is because the rules of search and seizure offer
variable protection-on some occasions requiring reasonable
suspicion prior to an intrusion, 9 on some occasions probable
cause, 91 and on still other occasions probable cause backed by
a warrant 92-that severe difficulties would be encountered in
settling on a single, comprehensive threshold for all fourth
amendment intrusions. Indeed, police work would become
easier if a single standard were adopted. But in employing a
single threshold the judiciary would have to disregard critical
divides of everyday life, such as the distinction between
sidewalks and private dwellings,9 3 or the distinction between
clothing and internal bodily organs.9 4 The Court's fourth

338 U.S. at 27. The example he gave of an arbitrary intrusion was 'the knock at the
door ... without authority of law but solely on the authority of the police." Id. at 28.
In Johnson, the Court held that, under the fourth amendment, even when officers
have probable cause to believe criminal activity is taking place in a dwelling, they
must, absent exigent circumstances, obtain a warrant to enter the dwelling. 333 U.S.
at 14-15. The Johnson Court conceded that the officers in the case may have had
probable cause to believe a crime was occurring. See id. at 13. Justice Frankfurter
and the other members of the Johnson majority thus could not have considered the
intrusion arbitrary. They nonetheless classified the officers' conduct as unconstitutional because they believed that, in the absence of exigent circumstances, the fourth
amendment requires a warrant for searching a dwelling.
90.
Reasonable suspicion is required for brief interference with fourth amendment liberty and property interests. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696,
702 (1983) (stating that it is appropriate to apply the reasonable suspicion standard
to a limited warrantless seizure of personal luggage). Reasonable suspicion can also
justify police interference with privacy interests when the interference is undertaken
for purposes of self-protection. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968).
91.
Probable cause is required for sustained interference with liberty and
property interests. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709-10 (1983). When
the police have carried out an arrest on the basis of probable cause, they may
interfere with the privacy interest an arrestee has in the contents of her pockets and
the area immediately around her person even when they do not have reason to fear
for their own safety. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224-37 (1973).
92.
Absent exigent circumstances or consent, a warrant is required to search a
home. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-15 (1948). Absent such circumstances, a warrant is also required to arrest someone in his home. See Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) (stating that "seizures inside a home without a
warrant are presumptively unreasonable"). See generally Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110
S. Ct. 2793, 2797 (1990).
93.
Compare United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1976) (holding that
a warrantless arrest of an individual in a public place is permissible) with Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (holding that a warrantless arrest of an
individual in his home is impermissible in the absence of exigent circumstances or
consent).
94.
Compare Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (holding that inspection of the
interior of a suspect's clothing is permissible when the suspect has been stopped on
the basis of reasonable suspicion and there was reasonable basis for the officer to fear
for his safety) with Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985) (holding that surgical
intrusion into a suspect's body for a bullet is impermissible despite the existence of
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amendment decisions have been keyed to the different privacy,
liberty, and property expectations that surround matters such
as those just mentioned. As long as the Court remains committed to capturing the different expectations associated with
various objects and activities, it will not be possible to establish
a single threshold for all fourth amendment intrusions.
It could be argued that while the Court cannot adopt a
single-threshold strategy for the entire fourth amendment, it
should at least simplify the rules governing intrusions on
certain types of objects. Under this approach, the Court would
create limited, as distinguished from comprehensive,
bright-line rules 9 5-rules that rely on a single threshold for
one type of intrusion, thus simplifying police work within a
carefully defined range of action. The key question to ask
about such limited bright-line rulemaking is whether it would
enhance the possibility of deterrence. It might be suggested
that even modest rule-simplification would facilitate deterrence, for one could claim that officers are likely to grasp
simplified rules bearing on one type of intrusion governed by
the fourth amendment as readily as they do simplified rules
that deal comprehensively with interrogation governed by the
fifth amendment. Alternatively, it might be suggested that
limited rule-simplification would not increase the possibility
of deterrence, for one could claim that as long as multiple
thresholds continue to govern intrusions, it is unlikely officers
will hear about-or comprehend if they are actually apprised
of-a limited simplification of rules.96

probable cause to believe that the bullet was fired at the suspect in self-defense
during the course of an attempted robbery).
95.
The Court has created comprehensive bright-line rules for the interrogation
of suspects who are in custodial detention. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,476-79
(1966). It has also established a comprehensive bright-line rule prohibiting police
interrogation of an indicted defendant if he requests the assistance of counsel.
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986). The Court has indicated that these
bright-line rules offer more protection than is constitutionally required. See Michigan
v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974) (discussing the Miranda rule); Oregon v. Elstad,
470 U.S. 298, 306-07 (1985) (same); Michigan v. Harvey, 110 S. Ct. 1176, 1179-80
(1990) (discussing the Jackson rule).
Our concern is not with the question of whether bright-line rules provide
protection that exceeds constitutional requirements but rather with the question of
whether they facilitate law enforcement. For a general discussion of the cognitive
purpose underlying the creation of bright-line rules, see Alschuler, Bright Line Fever
and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 227, 232-34 (1984).
96.
The statement in the alternative is necessary because it is not always clear
whether officers have simply not encountered a new Supreme Court rule or whether
they have encountered the rule but have been unable to place it within the terrain
of search and seizure law. Executives in each of the departments we studied assured
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Our findings offer support for the latter hypothesis.
Perhaps the most notable attempt by the Court at
bright-line rulemaking under the fourth amendment has
dealt with searches of movable vehicles.
In order to
investigate whether the police are less likely to be mistaken
about the legality of intrusions when limited bright-line
rules are involved, we drew two of our six scenarios from
movable vehicle cases-UnitedStates v. Ross9 7 and California
v. Carney.9" In Ross, the Court held that when there is
probable cause to search a car, police officers not only do not
need a warrant to search the car, they also do not need a
warrant to inspect the contents of movable containers found
in the course of their search.9 9 In Carney, decided three
10 0
years later, the Court extended the "automobile exception"
to movable mobile homes, holding that when the police have
probable cause to search such homes, they may do so without
a warrant. 1 ' The bright-line rule emerging from these
cases-that warrantless searches of movable vehicles and
containers found in them are permissible-does not, however,
seem to have been widely grasped by officers. As Table 2
indicates, the officers' performance on the Ross scenario was
poorer than their average overall performance- Their responses to the Carney scenario are even more revealing. On this
scenario the officers were most freqtfently mistaken; in all,
more than 60% of their responses to Carney were mistaken.
Compared with the results for the Miranda rules, the Ross
and Carney data make it clear that limited rule-simplification
does not enhance the possibility of deterrence. Miranda
provides bright-line rules that deal comprehensively with
interrogation. Although some exceptions to Miranda'srules
have developed over the years, 10 2 police officers can be

us that their officers were given handouts describing new Supreme Court rulings
pertaining to police work. We were not, however, able to find such handouts in two
of the six departments. More importantly, it is quite possible that even if all the
officers participating in the study were given handouts describing recent Supreme
Court opinions, some did not read them. Thus, it seems likely that some officers
simply did not know of developments in the law while others read about those
developments but were unable to grasp their significance.
97.
456 U.S. 798 (1982).
98.
471 U.S. 386 (1985).
99.
456 U.S. at 817-24.
100. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
101. Carney, 471 U.S. at 390-94.
102. See Illinois v. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. 2394, 2397-99 (1990) (holding that a
statement made in the absence of Miranda warnings is admissible on direct examination when obtained by a government informant during a conversation with an inmate
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confident that in mastering its rules, they have mastered
directives for the great majority of issues arising in custodial
interrogation. In contrast, because it is clear that no such
comprehensive rules can be developed in search and seizure
settings, the bright-line rules carved out by the Court have not
attracted officers' attention. Fourth amendment law remains
complex for the officers despite the occasional bright-line rules
found within it. For example, with respect to searches of
movable containers, the Court generally requires a warrant for
freestanding containers (such as luggage carried on a
train),1 °3 so an officer can master Ross's rules only by understanding that there are different thresholds for opening
luggage placed in a car as opposed to luggage carried on a
train or plane. With respect to searches of homes, the Court
also generally requires a warrant," 4 so an officer can master
Carney only by distinguishing between mobile motor homes
and other types of homes. If one multiplies the points just
made by the total number of objects and activities covered by
the fourth amendment, one can understand why the glow from
bright-line rules is not a strong one. 0 5 While police officers

about a crime for which he had not been incarcerated); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S.
649, 655-57 (1984) (holding that a statement made in the absence of Miranda warnings is admissible on direct examination when the government can show that special
circumstances required the officer to ask questions relating to public safety before
administering Miranda warnings). See also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304-09
(1985) (holding that a statement made after administration of Miranda warnings is
admissible on direct examination despite the fact that officers had initially obtained
the same statement without providing Miranda warnings and had failed, when
administering the warnings, to caution the suspect that the statement he had
initially made could not be used against him on direct examination).
103. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1977).
104. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 17 (1948).
105.
In fact, at the time we administered the questionnaire, the rules of search
and seizure were even more complex than we have suggested in the text. At that
time, different standards governed the opening of luggage initially discovered during
the search of a car that the police had probable cause to search as opposed to luggage
first seen outside of a car and later observed to be placed within it. Compare United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (holding that a warrantless search of an
automobile could include search of containers found within the car when the search
was supported by probable cause) with Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979)
(holding that a warrantless search of a suitcase found within an automobile was
unconstitutional when the police had probable cause to search the suitcase before it
was placed in the car). The Court eliminated this distinction in California v.
Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991) (noting that 'the existence of the dual regimes for
automobile searches that uncover containers has proved. . . confusing," 111 S. Ct. at
1991, and concluding "that it is better to adopt one clear-cut rule." Id.) Our
research, in any event, was concerned with a cruder distinction-between freestanding luggage and luggage initially discovered in a car believed to be involved in a
crime. Even this distinction eluded the majority of officers we surveyed.
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actually do grasp the directives emerging from comprehensive
rules of the kind found in Miranda, limited bright-line rules
placed within a larger body of complex rules make little
difference to them.
Modest simplification of the rules of search and seizure-the
only kind of simplification possible, given the varying expectations of privacy, liberty, and property associated with the
fourth amendment-cannot be expected, then, to enhance the
possibility of deterring illegal intrusions.
Courts must
confront, therefore, the stark fact that even when officers are
extensively trained and also disposed to adhere to the law,
they still will make a substantial number of errors about the
legality of intrusions because they do not know what the law
requires of them. In our research, extensively trained officers
were mistaken about 30% of the time (see Table 13). It is
possible that if we had employed different scenarios, this
figure would have been somewhat lower. It seems safe to say,
however, that given the inescapable complexity of the rules of
search and seizure, there is an uneliminable 20 to 30% margin
of error among even well-trained officers as to the legality of
intrusions governed by those rules. This sobering point must
be taken into account in thinking about the deterrence of
police illegality.

III. POLICE WILLINGNESS TO COMPLY
WITH THE RULES OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE
The paradigmatic violation of the fourth amendment is a
knowing one. The data just presented make it clear, however,
that many violations are likely to be unwitting in nature.
Whether the focus is on knowing or unwitting violations, one
must be concerned with police willingness to comply with the
law. Deliberate violations evince a clear-cut unwillingness to
comply with the law. In contrast, unwitting violations are
ambiguous on this point. When an officer unwittingly violates
the law, it is possible she would do otherwise if apprised of the
fourth amendment's mandates. Alternatively, it is possible
that her interest in carrying out an intrusion has influenced
her assessment of legality, in which case she might persist in
her conduct even if made aware of the law's requirements. We
begin our appraisal of police willingness to comply with the
law by examining the rate at which officers indicated they
would violate the law in the three search and seizure scenarios
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in which the intrusion was illegal. Next, we examine officers'
statements about which intrusions they would undertake in
light of their beliefs about the legality of those intrusions.

TABLE 8
PERCENT OF OFFICERS WHO REPORT THEY WOULD INTRUDE
IN CASES WHERE SEARCH OR SEIZURE IS ILLEGAL

% officers
reporting
they would
intrude

Cases where intrusion is illegal

n

66
61
23

Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979)
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968)
Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985)

(455)'b
(538)
(543)

This scenario was presented in three of the four departments surveyed.
n's on the Sibron and Hayes scenarios vary due to missing data.

TABLE 9
CONFORMITY VERSUS VIOLATION OF LAW AS A FUNCTION OF
OFFICER BELIEF OF LEGALITY WHEN INTRUSION IS ACTUALLY ILLEGAL

Nature of response
Knowing conformity to the law
Knowing violation of the law
Unwitting conformity to the law
Unwitting violation of the law

(n)

a
b

Ybarra

Sibron

Hayes

Combined
Total

34'
24
1
41
100

36
19
3
42
100

75
4
2
19
100

49
15
2
34
100

(444)b

(533)'

(540)

(1517)

Entries in the table are percentages.
This scenario was presented in three of the four departments surveyed.
n's on the Sibron and Hayes scenarios vary due to missing data.

The questionnaire included three scenarios that dealt with
intrusions the Court declared illegal. Combining the results
in these three scenarios, officers indicated in 49% of their
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responses that they would intrude ("violation-responses") and
in 51% that they would not. Thus almost exactly half the
time officers indicated they would engage in behavior violative of the law. Table 8 reveals that the percentage of
violation-responses was well above 50% in the Ybarra and
Sibron scenarios, the two scenarios in which officers had to
decide whether they could examine the contents of a suspect's
pockets. The average number of violation-responses for the
three scenarios is reduced to the 50% level only because of the
low number of such responses to the Hayes scenario. Here,
officers had to decide whether they could bring in a suspect
and have him fingerprinted when there was only reasonable
suspicion to detain him. Perhaps because of the seriousness
of this kind of intrusion, the officers registered far fewer
violation-responses to it than in Ybarra or Sibron intrusions.
The introductory remarks in this section described two
alternative cognitive states with respect to police violations of
fourth amendment law-deliberate and unwitting. These
states of mind are also applicable to acts conforming to the
law. Thus in any setting where intrusion is prohibited, four
kinds of responses are possible: knowing conformity to the
law, unwitting conformity, knowing violation of the law, and
unwitting violation. Table 9 indicates that most of the
conforming responses to the scenarios involved knowing
conformity to the law. Only a small percentage of responses
involved unwitting conformity; that is, on only a few occasions
did officers state that they believed it was legal to intrude in
a given setting but that they would not do so. In contrast,
there were a substantial number of knowing and unwitting
violation-responses.
The officers gave a particularly high
percentage of knowing violation-responses to the Ybarra
scenario; it is only because of the low percentage of knowing
violation-responses to Hayes that the total percentage of
knowing violation-responses is deflated.
The data in Table 9 suggest a three-panel picture of officers'
willingness to comply with the law. Nearly half the responses
manifested acceptance of the law. Officers providing these
knowing conformity-responses correctly noted that intrusion
was prohibited in a given setting and indicated they would not
intrude in that setting. Thus, these officers indicated they
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would act in just the way they were supposed to, given the
supremacy of law.
A substantial minority of responses, however, manifested a
direct challenge to the rule of law. Knowing violation-responses
comprised 15% of the total. Here, officers noted that intrusion
was prohibited in a given setting, but stated that they would
nonetheless intrude in that setting. The fact that nearly a
sixth of all responses indicated a deliberate disregard of the
law must be a matter of concern. Finally, an even more
substantial percentage of responses-the unwitting violationresponses, comprising about a third of the total-reflected an
ambiguous relationship to the rule of law. As we noted
earlier, an officer who unwittingly violates the law might in
fact conform to it if told that what she believed to be legal was
in fact illegal. Alternatively, such an officer might be primarily interested in carrying out an intrusion, in which case she
might not change her behavior even when apprised of the
law's requirements.
In search and seizure settings, then, the rule of constitutional law and the Constitution are directly challenged by
intrusions in which officers deliberately violate the law. The
exclusionary rule was designed to make such challenges a
thing of the past. The Mapp Court spoke of exclusion as
"'compel[ling] respect for the constitutional guaranty"' contained in the fourth amendment," 6 thus implying that
exclusion would stand as so powerful a threat to police officers
that it would ensure their adherence to the rule of law. Our
research indicates that exclusion's effect is milder than this.
Exclusion, we suggest, provides officers with a reminder of the
importance of the constitutionality of the intrusions they
undertake. Moreover, it may provide an incentive for officers
who already care about legality to learn about the law and
thereby reduce their rate of illegal intrusions. Exclusion does
not, however, compel officer adherence to the law. We shall
develop these points by examining, first, officers' willingness
to comply with what they believe to be required by law and,
second, training's effect in promoting compliance with the
actual requirements of law.

106. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,656 (1961) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
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In order to understand rates of compliance with what the
law actually requires, it is helpful to consider the degree to
which officers are willing to refrain from carrying out intrusions they believe to be prohibited by law.

TABLE 10
INTRUSIONS OFFICERS REPORT THEY WOULD MAKE
WHILE BELIEVING INTRUSION IS ILLEGAL FOR SIX SCENARIOS

Number of cases in
which officer reports
he would intrude
0
1
2
3
4
5
6

% of
Officers
53
31
12
3
1
0
0
100
(n = 493)*

Includes officers who responded to the intrusion item for all six scenarios.

If the exclusionary rule compelled respect for the law, officers
responding to the questionnaire would always-or at least
almost always-have indicated they would not intrude in
settings where they believed the intrusion to be illegal. Table
10 reveals that this is far from the case. About 53% of the
responding officers showed unequivocal respect for the law by
always indicating that they would refrain from intruding in
settings where they considered the intrusion illegal. However,
about the same percentage of officers evidenced equivocal
respect for the law by indicating that sometimes they were
prepared to intrude in settings where they considered the
intrusion illegal. We emphasize that these figures deal only
with a dispositional issue: whether officers are willing to
honor what they believe to be legal prohibitions. Even when
officers are willing to refrain from intruding in settings where
they consider this illegal, they may nonetheless unwittingly

350

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[VOL.

24:2

violate the law by carrying out an intrusion. The data in
Table 10 have no bearing on this latter point. What they do
establish, though, is that even when exclusion is present as a
threat for illegal conduct, a substantial percentage of officers
are prepared to act in violation of what they think the
Constitution requires.
Two factors help account for the data just presented on
responding officers' willingness to depart from the law. The
first factor pertains to the nature of the scenarios used in the
questionnaire. As we have already suggested, the likelihood
of sanctions other than exclusion-in particular, civil and
criminal liability and internal departmental discipline-is
lowest when illegal intrusions are not patently arbitrary and
do not produce serious harm.1 °7
Executives within the
departments in which we conducted research agreed with this
claim; furthermore, they agreed that because the scenarios
used in this study did not involve arbitrary or seriously
harmful intrusions, these intrusions would trigger only
exclusion-following a judicial determination that the intrusions were illegal-as a sanction. As one executive stated, our
08
scenarios dealt with "doing your job" intrusions."
In his
opinion, officers do not have to fear personal legal liability for
such intrusions. Moreover, while he recognized that some
officers deliberately violate the law in "doing your job" intrusions, he said he was reluctant to invoke internal discipline
against deliberate violators who do not act in a clearly
arbitrary fashion and do not cause substantial harm.
The second factor pertains to the indirect nature of the
sanction that exclusion imposes on police officers. Exclusion's
sanction is imposed on the state, not on erring officers. If, as
was the case in the scenarios, there is a low likelihood that an
officer will face a direct sanction for an illegal intrusion, one
can readily understand why an officer may decide to go ahead
with an intrusion she considers illegal. An officer may do so
for "now-or-never" reasons: it might be unlikely, for instance,
107. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
108. In interviews Professor Heffernan conducted during the course of this
research, executives in each department were asked whether they thought it likely
that an officer engaging in an intrusion reported in any of the scenarios would be
subjected to legal or departmental sanctions if a court were to determine that the
intrusion was illegal. The comment on "doing your job" intrusions was made by the
chief of one of the departments in the study. See supra note 73.

WINTER 1991]

Evaluating the Exclusionary Rule

that material which is available during an encounter will be
available again. Alternatively, an officer might carry out an
intrusion for a more disturbing reason-to harass a suspect,
for example, or to obtain evidence with the expectation of
committing perjury about the circumstances in which it was
acquired. These and other reasons can prompt a decision to
intrude despite an officer's belief that the intrusion is
unconstitutional.
Indeed, exclusion poses so weak a threat to officers that one
must conclude that the more interesting figure in Table 10 has
to do with the consistent unwillingness of some officers, rather
than the occasional willingness of others, to depart from the
Constitution's requirements. About 53% of the officers, it will
be recalled, showed unequivocal respect for the law by never
indicating that they would intrude in a setting where they
believed it illegal to do so. Because we were careful not to ask
officers directly whether they would intrude when they considered the intrusion illegal (the data in Table 10 are based on a
comparison of answers to two questions rather than a single,
direct question about willingness to comply with the law), we
cannot offer a firm explanation for the substantial percentage
of officers showing unequivocal respect for the law. It is
plausible, however, that while exclusion does not compel
respect for the law, it nonetheless enhances police compliance
with the law. Exclusion provides officers with a day-to-day
reminder of the importance of adherence to the law. Whenever
an officer carries out an intrusion, he can expect questions
from a prosecutor when the case reaches the intake stage, and
questions from a defense attorney if it is forwarded for trial.
Such questions generate considerable pressure to comply with
the law. Many officers, it is clear, are prepared to ignore this
pressure and give priority to extra-legal considerations in
carrying out intrusions. Many others, however, appear to
respond favorably to exclusion's reminder of the importance of
legality.
Given the frequency with which officers are mistaken about
the law, it is important to note that the public does not always
benefit more from the conduct of officers who are unequivocal
in their respect for the rule of law than from that of equivocal
officers.
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TABLE 11
ILLEGAL INTRUSIONS NOT COMMITTED AND LEGAL INTRUSIONS
FOREGONE AS A FUNCTION OF OFFICER SUPPORT OF THE LAW

Cases Where Intrusion Is Illegal
Combined
Ybarra'
Sibron
Hayes
Total
Officer support of law:b
Equiv Uneqv Equiv Uneqv Equiv Uneqv Equiv Uneqv
Knowing illegal intrusions
49C
40
9
30
Unwitting illegal intrusions
33
50
33
50
15
20
26
37
Total illegal intrusions
82
50
73
50
24
20
56
37
Illegal intrusions uncommitted 18
50
27
50
76
80
44
63
100
100
100
100
100
100
100 100
(n)d
(217) (228) (248) (286) (251) (292) (716) (806)

Officer support of law:'
Knowing legal intrusions
Unwitting legal intrusions
Total legal intrusions
Legal intrusions foregone
(n)d

Cases Where Intrusion Is Legal
Combined
Hayden
Ross
Carney
Total
Equiv Uneqv Equiv Uneqv Equiv Uneqv Equiv Uneqv
50
58
44
57
34
40
43
52
22
22
8
17
72
58
66
57
42
40
60
52
28
42
34
43
58
60
40
48
100
100 100
100
100
100
100 100
(251) (289) (250) (292) (250) (290) (751)(871)

This scenario was presented to three of the four departments surveyed.
Equiv = equivocal (will intrude believing it to be illegal)
Uneqv = unequivocal (will not intrude believing it is illegal)
Entries in the table are percentages.
n's vary due to missing data.

In fact, in examining the relationship between officers'
commitment to the rule of law and the frequency of illegal
intrusions, two different trends emerge. On the one hand, as
the upper portion of Table 11 demonstrates, in comparison to
equivocal officers, unequivocal officers are less frequently
prepared to carry out illegal intrusions.
By definition,
unequivocal officers only carry out illegal intrusions unwittingly. Table 11 indicates that unequivocal officers are more
likely to carry out unwitting illegal intrusions than equivocal
officers. However, when one also considers deliberate illegal
intrusions by equivocal officers, then the frequency of illegal
intrusions by equivocal officers becomes greater than the
frequency for unequivocal officers.
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The lower portion of Table 11, on the other hand, points to
a loss the public suffers when officers are unequivocally
committed to the rule of law. Ideally, one would like officers
never to carry out illegal intrusions and to carry out all legal
intrusions. The frequency with which officers are mistaken
about the law makes this ideal a distant reality. What is
more, because officers can be mistaken about intrusions that
are actually legal as well as those that are actually illegal, one
frequently encounters instances in which officers fail to carry
out legal intrusions. The lower portion of Table 11 deals with
the phenomenon of the foregone legal intrusion. As is made
clear by the line for intrusions in which officers knowingly
conform to the law, unequivocal officers make more such
intrusions than equivocal officers. The other lines in the lower
portion of Table 11, however, show that the total percentage
of legal intrusions is higher for equivocal than for unequivocal
officers because the former are prepared to carry out intrusions they believe to be illegal while the latter are not.
Equivocal officers, it is clear,often intrude for the wrong reason.
In contrast, unequivocal officers-officers committed to the rule
of law-often fail to intrude because they mistakenly believe
intrusion to be illegal.

TABLE 12
OFFICER WILLINGNESS TO VIOLATE THE LAW
AS A FUNCTION OF EXTENT OF TRAINING IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Extent of Training
in Criminal Procedure
Officer orientation
to violation of the law
Equivocal support for the law
Unequivocal support for the law
(n)

Basic

Moderate

Extensive

Total

45'

50

48

47

55
100
(273)

50
100
(177)

52
100
(95)

53
100
(545)

[Chi-square = 1.6 df = 2 p = .45

b

The entries in the table are percentages.
The Chi-square test measures how likely the overall distribution of scores
is due to pure chance. Thus, there is a probability of .45 that the above
result could have happened by chance. This means that there is no
difference in extent of support of the law based on training.
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Does training increase police disposition to comply with the
law? As we have already noted, training has a significant,
positive influence on officers' knowledge of the law. Table 12
demonstrates, however, that we can not say the same thing
about training's effect on officers' willingness to comply with
what they believe the law requires. The data in Table 12
reveal that officers do not become more committed to the rule
of law as a result of increased training. Instead, commitment
to the rule of law appears to be formed independently of
training.

TABLE 13
TYPE OF OUTCOME IN SCENARIOS AS A FUNCTION OF EXTENT OF
TRAINING IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND SUPPORT OF THE LAW

Officers Who Are Equivocal in Their Support of the Law

Nature of response
Knowing conformity to the law
Knowing violation of the law
Unwitting conformity to the law
Unwitting violation of the law
(n)
Total scenarios

Basic
41'
34
2
23
100
(119)
(311)

Extent of Training
Moderate
37
36
1
27
100
(88)
(256)

Extensive
39
44
0
28
100
(46)
(134)

Officers Who Are Unequivocal in Their Support of the Law

Nature of response
Knowing conformity to the law
Knowing violation of the law
Unwitting conformity to the law
Unwitting violation of the law
(n)
Total scenarios

Basic
52
3
44
10
(150)
(420)

Extent of Training
Moderate
64
1
35
100
(89)
(248)

Extensive
72
0
28
1O0
(48)
(141)

The entries in the table are percentages.

Although training does not play a major role in shaping
officers' disposition to comply with the law, it does at least
play an important role in reducing actual violations of the
law among officers who are already disposed to honor its
prohibitions. This point is critical, given the large number of
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unwitting violations that officers commit. As noted earlier,
15% of the responses to the illegal intrusion scenarios were of
the knowing violation type (see Table 9). More than twice as
many responses, however-34% in all-were of the unwitting
violation type. Given the points just made about training's
lack of influence on disposition to comply with the law, it
should come as no surprise that at higher levels of training
there was no reduction in responses involving deliberate
violations of the law. As Table 13 demonstrates, increased
training was not even linked to a reduction of unwitting
violations among officers who showed an equivocal commitment to the rule of law. Among unequivocal officers, however,
training was clearly connected to a reduction in the rate of
unwitting violation-responses. This group stands out for the
simple reason that its increased knowledge of the law was
translated directly into a lower rate of violation-responses.
With extensive training, unequivocal officers showed nearly
the same score for correct intrusions-about 70%-that was
encountered for all extensively trained officers when knowledge of the law was at issue. For unequivocal officers, then,
the ambiguity inherent in the unwitting violation-response is
resolved in favor of fewer violations of the law. Increased
training leads to increased knowledge of the law; furthermore,
given an unequivocal commitment to adherence to the law,
knowledge of the law insures behavioral conformity to its
requirements.

IV. DISCUSSION:
EXCLUSION'S IMPACT ON POLICE COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW

Our results suggest that the possibility of deterring illegal
searches and seizures is more limited than the Court and
many commentators have supposed. Our data also indicate
that exclusion does not stand as a strong deterrent against
police illegality. In this section, we shall develop the implications of each of these points, and, in doing so, provide an
assessment of the contribution exclusion can make to the
reduction of police illegality.
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A. A Cognitive Limit on the Possibility
of Deterring Violations of the Rules of Search and Seizure

Deterrence, we have argued, operates through the communication to an individual of a threat of unpleasant consequences
if the individual engages in a prohibited act. As we noted at
the outset, it is likely that police officers understand that
certain obvious acts-the arbitrary invasion of a home, for
example, or the execution of an arbitrary arrest-are banned
under the fourth amendment. An officer has not mastered the
fourth amendment sufficiently if she is merely certain it
prohibits these acts. Fourth amendment law is defined not
only by a core principle that prohibits arbitrary intrusions but
also by a set of specific rules of search and seizure that offer
protection which exceeds the protection afforded by the core
principle. In conducting our research, we assumed that
officers are acquainted with the prohibition of arbitrary
intrusions; therefore, we focused our investigation on the
extent of the officers' knowledge of the specific rules of search
and seizure.
Our research indicates that more than 30 years after Mapp
applied the exclusionary rule to the states, officers are
frequently uncertain of what they may and may not do when
specific rules of search and seizure govern their conduct.
Moreover, our research indicates that there is probably an
uneliminable margin of error in police officers' knowledge of
specific rules. We found that not only extensively trained
officers, but defense lawyers and prosecutors as well, were
mistaken about a quarter of the time with respect to the legality
of intrusions governed by specific rules of search and seizure.
Furthermore, we found that officers were no more likely to
grasp bright-line search and seizure rules-rules that presumably simplify the law and so increase its accessibility-than
other rules. The fourth amendment permits only limited
rule-simplification; however, limited rule-simplification, we
discovered, does not enhance police understanding of the
9
law.

10

Two implications of the uneliminable margin of error
deserve consideration. In the first place, it is important to
note the irony underlying the exclusionary rule's contribution

109.

See supra notes 95-105 and accompanying text.
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to fourth amendment complexity. The Court, of course, has
stated that the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to
deter illegal searches and seizures.1 1 ° We believe, however,
that the litigation incentives provided by exclusion have
frustrated deterrence. By providing defendants with a strong
inducement to litigate the legality by which evidence against
them was obtained, the exclusionary rule has led to a vast
increase in the complexity of the rules of search and seizure
and has thereby contributed to officers' difficulty in determining what the law permits.1 " In the absence of exclusion,
rules of search and seizure would be articulated from time to
time through mechanisms such as tort litigation and applications for injunctions." 2
Exclusion, however, provides a
strong incentive to litigate the legality of an intrusion whenever a defendant can reduce or completely avoid criminal
liability by having tainted evidence excluded. Thus, exclusion
makes it necessary for the courts to consider the content of the
rules of search and seizure far more frequently than they
otherwise would. Officers in turn are supposed to know the
search and seizure decisions that have been reached by the
intermediate state appellate courts for their jurisdictions, by
their highest state appellate courts, by the lower federal courts
for their jurisdictions, and by the United States Supreme
Court. We have focused only on rules announced by the last
of these courts. Our results point toward a cognitive limit to
deterrence even for rules announced by the Supreme Court.
Undoubtedly, a more substantial limit would be encountered
for rules announced by lower courts.

110. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984); United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974).
111. See Grano, Introduction-The Changed and Changing World ofConstitutional
CriminalProcedure: The Contribution of the Department of Justice's Office of Legal
Policy, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 395, 412 (1989) (stating that the exclusionary rule has
resulted in "arcane and often hair-splitting intricacies [in] search and seizure law").
But see Kamisar, Remembering the "Old World" of CriminalProcedure: A Reply to
Professor Grano, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 537, 557 (1990) ("The exclusionary rule did
not make the law complicated and difficult.... The rule only made a difficult and
complex body of law relevant....
[One should not confuse] the content of the law of
search and seizure with the remedy if that body of law is violated.").
112. For example, the current rule governing police use of deadly force against a
fleeing felon was articulated through tort litigation. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner,
471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (stating, in a section 1983 action, that '[a] police officer may not
seize an unarmed, dangerous suspect by shooting him dead."). As for injunctions, a
suspect's application for an injunction prompted a ruling by the Court prohibiting
surgical intrusion into a suspect's body even though there was probable cause to
believe that the bullet lodged in the suspect's body would provide evidence of the
suspect's involvement in a crime. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985).
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The second point has to do with the implications of a
cognitive limit for any type of deterrence strategy courts might
employ. With the complex body of rules of search and seizure
now in place, officers' mistaken beliefs about the law are
bound to frustrate the aims of any deterrence strategy. Even
if the exclusionary rule were abolished overnight, the cognitive
limit to deterrence that we have described would not disappear. Whatever the state of the law in the days before Mapp
might have been, the body of law confronting officers now is
formidably large." 3 Assuming that courts did not wish this
body of law to be merely hortatory, then any effort to develop
a strategy for discouraging police illegality must come to terms
with the fact that even extensively trained officers are likely
to be mistaken about the law in a substantial minority of
instances.
B. Exclusion as a Weak Deterrent
The data presented above also make it clear that exclusion
offers only a weak deterrent safeguard against police illegality.
Given the fact that the exclusionary rule is imposed directly
on the state rather than on erring officers, one would expect
to find that officers frequently are prepared not to give
primacy to their assessments of legality in carrying out
intrusions. Our research findings bear this point out.
If exclusion were a strong deterrent-if, to draw on a claim
advanced by the Mapp Court, it "compel[led] respect" for the
law" 4-few officers would indicate that they are willing to
carry out intrusions they believe to be illegal. In fact, as we
noted in the previous section, about half the officers responding to our questionnaire indicated that they were prepared in
at least one of the six scenarios to carry out an intrusion they
considered illegal. An ironic benefit of this is that officers
showing an equivocal commitment to the rule of law are less
likely than officers showing an unequivocal commitment to
indicate that they would forego an opportunity for an intrusion

113.
The four volumes of Wayne LaFave's treatise on the fourth amendment attest
to this. See generally W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1987). Most of the legal rules LaFave discusses in the treatise
were generated by means of exclusionary litigation. Were the exclusionary rule to
be abolished, the rules discussed by LaFave would continue to be binding.
114.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
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that in fact is legal. Equivocal officers, on the other hand, are
more prepared to engage in intrusions that in fact are illegal;
in this respect, they highlight particularly well exclusion's
weakness as a deterrent.
One should not conclude, however, that exclusion makes no
contribution to the discouragement of police illegality. Although exclusion's sanction is directly imposed on the state,
officers cannot disregard it altogether, in part because they
can expect to be questioned by prosecutors and defense
lawyers about their conduct and in part because it is hard to
be wholly indifferent to the prospect of harming a case
through the suppression of evidence. The large percentage of
equivocal officers makes it clear that these factors actually are
discounted by a substantial percentage of the police. It seems
plausible to conclude, though, that the factors associated with
exclusion had some effect in producing the equally large
percentage of officers in the survey who showed an unequivocal commitment to the rule of law. It is arguable, of course,
that even without exclusion the same percentage of officers
might have indicated that they would have refrained from
carrying out intrusions they believed to be illegal. The more
convincing analysis, however, is that exclusion contributed in
some measure to the size of the unequivocal group through its
provision of institutional factors that remind officers of the
importance of legality in their encounters with citizens. We
suggest that exclusion stands as a weak, yet significant,
deterrent against illegality. Its effect on the police hinges on
the institutional processes they can expect to confront when
they carry out intrusions that lead to prosecution. Exposure
to these institutional processes may be less unpleasant than
other types of experience; however, anticipation of the.institutional processes associated with exclusion can have some effect
in shaping behavior.
C. Exclusion's Weakness as a Strength:
The Role of Direct and Indirect Sanctions
in DeterringIllegal Searches and Seizures
What bearing do these points have on the debate about
retaining the exclusionary rule? Critics of the rule1 15 might

115.

See, e.g., Grano, supra note 111; OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF

JUSTICE, TRUTH IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERIES, REPORT No. 2, REPORT TO THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE EXCLUSIONARY RULE (1986),
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view our findings as providing further reason-over and above
the cost of exclusion-for abolishing it. We think, however,
that when one takes into account the frequency with which
officers are mistaken about the law, exclusion's weakness
must be counted as a strength. To understand why exclusion
should be viewed in this way, one must consider the role direct
and indirect sanctions can play in deterring fourth amendment
violations. We shall note initially the role these sanctions
currently play in deterring police illegality; then we shall
discuss the role each ought to play.
Consider first the circumstances in which there is currently
some likelihood that an officer making an illegal intrusion will
be subjected to direct sanctions as well as the indirect sanction
of exclusion. Whenever an officer acts in a patently illegal
fashion and brings about serious harm in doing so-when an
officer brutalizes a suspect, for example, or when he ransacks
a home in the absence of probable cause for entering it-there
is some likelihood he will be subjected to direct sanctions for
his conduct. We use the term "some likelihood" here because
direct sanctions are not always imposed even when officers act
egregiously.1 16 There are a number of reasons why a direct
sanction may not be applied: prosecutors are sometimes
reluctant to proceed against officers for fear of straining
relations with police departments;.. 7 juries are sometimes
118
disinclined to convict those they view as trustworthy;
police review boards tend to see matters from an officer's

reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 573 (1989); S. SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY
INJUSTICE (1977); Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Costs and Viable Alternatives,
CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1982, at 16.
116. The Christopher Commission's report on the Los Angeles Police Department
provides an example of this. According to a story in The Wall Street Journal:
The report shows a particularly damning pattern of acceptance, and even
encouragement, of officers who violate the rules governing excessive force. One
officer who had seven complaints against him that had been sustained-as well
as numerous others that hadn't been-was described in his performance
evaluation this way: "His contacts with the public are always professional and
positive and his attitude with the citizens is of one of concern."
Jefferson & Nazario, Report on Los Angeles Police Department Finds Racism,
Suggests Changes, Gates's Resignation, Wall St. J., July 10, 1991, at A12, col. 1.
117. For discussion of why criminal sanctions are sometimes not imposed even
when officers cause substantial harm while acting in a patently illegal fashion, see
Judge Newman's comments, supra note 70.
118. See Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins,Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM.
L. REV. 1365, 1387 (1983).
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perspective; 19 and so on. Exclusion, on the other hand, is
a quite likely sanction in settings where officers act in a
gravely wrongful manner. 2 ° Exclusion is of course not
imposed when an intrusion does not lead to trial. But when
it does lead to trial, exclusion provides a relatively certain
backstop deterrent against the most serious types of police
illegality.
In contrast, the likelihood of direct sanctions decreases as
illegality becomes less patent and harm less serious. With
respect to the patentness of illegality, officers often are able to
benefit from qualified immunity in legal proceedings' 2 ' and
from a reluctance within departments to impose internal
discipline on officers who have not acted in a clearly illegal
fashion. 22 With respect to the seriousness of harm, it is
likely that victims of illegal intrusions will be less inclined to
complain about the treatment they have received, the more
modest the harm done to them.1 23 At the low point of both
variables, then-nonpatent illegality and modest harm-the
likelihood of direct sanctions is negligible. 24 A community

119. See Schwartz, supra note 70, at 1027-28.
120.
It is true that judicial decision making at suppression hearings can also be
infected by pro-police bias. However, two factors make it less likely that this bias
will be present in an exclusionary setting than in one where direct sanctions are at
stake. First, the indirect status of the exclusionary sanction offers judges an
impersonal way of responding to police misconduct. And second, because judges are
frequently called on to determine what happened in a police intrusion, they are less
inclined than juries to give credence to police accounts of the facts. For discussion
of this latter point see Note, supra note 41, at 1049.
121. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-40 (1987) (describing the
qualified immunity provided to "government officials performing discretionary
functions" as long as they do not violate rights that are "clearly established").
122. See supra note 73.
123. Under the rule established in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257-59 (1978),
compensation for actual harm provides the starting point for determining damages
in section 1983 litigation. As long as damages are limited to compensation for harm
done, modest fourth amendment wrongs-a brief illegal street stop, for example, or
the illegal inspection of the contents of a person's pockets-are unlikely to produce
substantial damage awards. The victims of such wrongs will thus have little
incentive to seek redress for the harm done them.
124. In his Harlan Fiske Stone Lecture at Columbia Law School, Justice Stewart
commented:
Taken together, the currently available alternatives to the exclusionary rule...
punish and perhaps deter the grossest of violations [of the fourth amendment],
as well as governmental policies that legitimate these violations. They
compensate some of the victims of the most egregious violations. But they do
little, if anything, to reduce the likelihood of the vast majority of fourth
amendment violations-the frequent infringements motivated by commendable
zeal, not condemnable malice.
Stewart, supra note 118, at 1388-89.
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can suffer significant cumulative damage when its citizens are
routinely subjected to intrusions involving nonpatent illegality
and modest harm. 125 As matters stand, though, direct sanctions are unlikely for such intrusions; exclusion is the sole
sanction officers can expect.
Should a mechanism be devised-as a substitute for the
exclusionary rule-that would impose direct sanctions on
officers for all violations of the fourth amendment? In particular, should a policy of direct deterrence be pursued even for
violations of the rules of search and seizure that produce only
modest harm? The transaction costs associated with such a
policy are daunting because due process requires that nonprobationary officers be provided with an opportunity to counter
charges against them when the charges could lead to imposition of a serious direct sanction. 126 However, our data on
police knowledge of the law provide a telling argument against
such a policy wholly apart from the issue of transaction costs.
Our results indicate that a substantial proportion of police
violations of the rules of search and seizure are unwitting in
nature, so a direct sanction for violations of these rules would
have the effect of triggering doubts about intrusions that are
actually legal and thus would increase the number of foregone
legal intrusions. Even with substantial training, our results
suggest that police officers are likely to be mistaken about a
quarter of the time about the legality of intrusions where
specific rules of search and seizure are involved. If a direct
sanction policy were instituted for all intrusions, officers might
routinely refrain from intruding when they were uncertain
about the legality of doing so. Vigorous law enforcement
would be inhibited; uncertainty would be resolved in favor of
inaction.
It is the heavy-handedness of direct sanctions, then, that
makes them inappropriate as deterrents against violations of
specific rules of search and seizure that cause modest harm.
On the other hand, if there were not even an indirect sanction
for such violations, officers would have no reminder of the
importance of legality in most instances where specific rules

125.

For an analysis of the harm done to a Manhattan neighborhood by routine

police illegality, see P. CHEVIGNY, POLICE POWER: POLICE ABUSES IN NEW YORK CITY

(1969).
126. Cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985) ("The
opportunity to present reasons, either in person or in writing, why proposed action
should not be taken is a fundamental due process requirement.").

WINTER

1991]

Evaluating the Exclusionary Rule

363

of search and seizure are involved. As we have noted, routine
police indifference to the rules of search and seizure can have
a serious effect on the quality of life in a community.12 ' If
no indirect sanction were employed to discourage police
illegality, such indifference could be expected in most instances
where intrusions are governed by specific rules of search and
seizure. These rules, which are essential to the maintenance
of individual dignity, in large measure would be ignored.
Does this mean, then, that the exclusionary rule stands as
the appropriate indirect sanction for police violations of the
rules of search and seizure? Critics of exclusion such as
former Chief Justice Burger have conceded the low likelihood,
if not the undesirability, of imposing direct sanctions on
officers through the legal process.12 However, Burger has
not treated this as a reason for retaining exclusion, for he has
argued that a cause of action against the government for
monetary damages-in other words, a financial indirect
sanction-would be preferable to exclusion.129
Burger's
argument for a cause of action against the government is
based partly on the claim that society pays too high a price for
exclusion, 3 ° a claim that is open to challenge in light of
recent research showing that only a small percentage of
prosecutions fail because of the exclusionary rule. 3 ' Wholly
apart from this, though, one can criticize Burger's proposal on
deterrence grounds. If substantial damages were assessed
against the government even for intrusions that cause modest
harm, the likely result would be a major increase in foregone
legal intrusions because officers would be made to understand
that they should not take risks with the government's financial security when they are uncertain about the law. On the
other hand, if only nominal damages were available for
intrusions causing modest harm, victims of illegal intrusions
would be unlikely to sue; officers in turn would come to view
the occasional claims brought by victims as one of the costs
(borne by their employer) of doing business.

127. See supra note 125.
128. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 421-22 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
129. See id. at 422-23.
130. See id. at 413.
131. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
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A further difficulty with using a financial sanction as an
indirect deterrent relates to the differing ability and willingness of governmental bodies to pay damage awards. A
prosperous suburb would have greater resources with which
to pay a substantial damage award than would a city with
poor residents, thus making the leaders of the suburb more
likely to entertain the possibility of buying themselves out of
illegal intrusions. Furthermore, even where government
bodies have an equal ability to pay, there might be different
willingness to bear the cost of illegal intrusions, so one
government might adopt a policy that allows for substantial
illegality while another might not.
In contrast, exclusion is not subject to these kinds of difficulties because its sanction involves a nonfinancial aspect of
government. Exclusion's focus on evidence of guilt has an
equalizing effect on governments; the disability it imposes is
similar for governments that are prosperous and those that
are not. Moreover, exclusion is an instructive deterrent in a
way that a monetary cause of action cannot be, for exclusion's
sanction relates to the purpose that underlies most illegal
intrusions:
obtaining evidence of guilt.
Because it is
wise-given the routine nature of police error about the rules
of search and seizure-not to sanction officers directly for
modest harm they bring about through violation of those rules,
it is particularly important to use an indirect sanction that
focuses attention on the purpose that usually prompts illegal
intrusions. A cause of action for damages against the government would focus officers' attention on issues of financial
cost-on whether governments could afford the cost of a
determination that they had acted illegally. Exclusion's focus
on an issue essential to criminal justice serves as the proper
reminder to officers of the importance of complying with the
law.

D. Exclusion and "Good Faith"Mistakes

One further point should be considered: the possibility of
creating an across-the-board "good faith" exception to the
exclusionary rule. As we noted in the introductory section, the
Court has already allowed for some exceptions to the
exclusionary rule when the police make "good faith" mistakes
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in carrying out searches and seizures.' 3 2 In the 1984 case of
United States v. Leon,'3 3 the Court created an exception to
the exclusionary rule for evidence obtained through a seemingly valid warrant that courts later determine to be defective. 34 Three years later, in Illinois v. Krull,'3 5 the Court
expanded this exclusionary rule exception to allow for the
admission of evidence obtained through a warrantless intrusion based on seemingly constitutional statutes. 1 36 Furthermore, in cases decided at about the same time as Leon and
Krull, the Court also held that officers are entitled to a similar
defense in monetary damage actions alleging fourth amendment violations.1 37 Clearly, a key question that is likely to
confront the Court is whether to create an exception to the
exclusionary rule that, like the defense in civil actions, covers
all warrantless intrusions by the police. 3 ' In considering
this issue, we first note the meaning the Court attaches to the
term "good faith mistake"; next we review the question of
whether to allow for an across-the-board "good faith" exception
in light of the findings that already have been discussed here.
References to "good faith" mistakes are so frequent that it
made sense to begin discussion of a possible change in the
exclusionary rule by invoking this term. The Court, however,
although occasionally referring on its own to a "good faith
exception," 39 has always been careful to emphasize that it
is concerned in this context not with the subjective issue of
whether an officer believed her conduct to be lawful but with
the objective issue of whether the officer acted reasonably. 4 °
The distinction is an important one, for it makes clear that
courts cannot allow the admission of evidence merely because
officers testify that they thought they were acting properly.

132. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
133. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
134. Id. at 926.
135. 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
136. Id. at 356-61.
137. See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1986) (holding that an
officer is entitled to qualified immunity where it was objectively reasonable for an
officer to conclude that a search was supported by probable cause or exigent circumstances); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (recognizing the Malley
holding).
138. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987), did not distinguish between
warrantless and warrant-based intrusions with respect to the issue of qualified
immunity in civil actions.
139. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 n.11 (1984).
140. See, e.g., id. at 919-20 n.20.
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Nevertheless, one can still employ a provisional definition of
objective reasonableness that focuses on officers' actual awareness of the law. Because the exclusionary rule is designed,
among other things, to encourage police training in fourth
amendment law, 141 one can say that, at the very least, an
illegal intrusion is not "objectively reasonable" if a majority of
extensively trained officers are aware that it is illegal. This
stands only as a provisional definition of the objectively
reasonable, for some might insist that officer training is not
sufficiently detailed to warrant reliance on even the range of
knowledge possessed by extensively trained officers. As a
provisional definition it is quite useful, though, because it
emphasizes the incentive exclusion provides for increased
training while focusing attention on those who have been so
trained.
With this provisional definition as a backdrop, the argument
for extending the "good faith" exception appears weak for
three reasons. In the first place, in none of the scenarios we
used in the questionnaire were extensively trained officers
mistaken more often than not about the law. A substantial
majority of all the officers surveyed were mistaken about the
legality of the intrusion in Carney; the majority of extensively
trained officers, on the other hand, were correct about the
intrusion in this and all the other scenarios. Our scenarios
did not, of course, cover the entire range of settings in which
officers must decide whether an intrusion is legal. Given the
results we obtained, however, we conclude that the burden of
proof as to the possibility of knowledge of the law should be
borne by those who argue that officers cannot reasonably be
expected to identify the intrusions governed by the fourth
amendment. Our results show that training counts: even
when a majority of officers with low training are unable to
identify the unlawfulness of an intrusion, officers with
extensive training are able to do so.
A second difficulty with the argument for an extension of the
"good faith" exception is that a significant minority of officers

141. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) ("The purpose of the exclusionary
rule 'is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only
effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it.'") (citation
omitted). Assuming that the Court intends the natural consequences of its acts, then
it surely intended to encourage police training in the law of the fourth amendment.
A direct consequence of the Mapp decision was massive officer training. Kamisar,
supra note 111, at 559.
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are willing to violate the law knowingly. The Court's (quite
proper) insistence on using an objective standard for exceptions to the exclusionary rule makes it possible for officers to
understand they are violating the law, yet secure admissible
evidence because of the objective reasonableness of their
conduct. The likelihood of such knowing violations is very
slim in the two settings where the exclusionary exception has
already been created; few officers are likely to be able to tell
that a facially valid warrant is defective, 142 and fewer still
are likely to be able to discern the unconstitutionality of a
seemingly proper statute. 143 Our findings indicate, however,
that a non-negligible minority of illegal intrusions by officers
in general-about 15%-are deliberate in nature. Moreover,
if one focuses on knowing violations of the law by extensively
trained officers, the rate increases to 20%. Addition of a
subjective dimension to the exclusionary exception (in which
case officers would have to be asked at suppression hearings
whether they were aware of the illegality of their intrusions)
would be counterproductive because officers would realize that
admission of awareness of illegality could expose them to
criminal and civil liability. 1 44 Thus, given the Court's sole

142. To be able to do so, officers would have to be acquainted with the formalities
of warrant law, see, e.g. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 989-90 (1984)
(discussing warrant formality issues), and would also have to be able to determine
when probable cause is present and when it is not, see, e.g., Leon, 468 U.S. at 900.
143. The difficulty an officer confronts in assessing the constitutionality of a
statute authorizing a warrantless intrusion is illustrated by the Court's decisions on
this matter during the 1986 term. In Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987), the Court
held that, although the Illinois Supreme Court had concluded that a statute
authorizing warrantless inspection of automobile junkyards violated the fourth
amendment, id. at 345-46, it was objectively reasonable for an officer to believe-prior to judicial determination of the matter-that the statute was constitutional, id. at 356-60. Three months later, in New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691
(1987), the Court held that a New York statute that was similar in many respects to
the statute at issue in Krull was in fact constitutional. Id. at 708-18. The similarity
between the statutes was noted by the Illinois Supreme Court when it considered
Krull on remand from the Supreme Court. People v. Krull, 126 Ill. 2d 235, 246-47,
534 N.E.2d 125, 130 (1989). Whether the Illinois statute in fact conformed to the test
the Court employed three months later in Burger is an open question.
144.
In Leon, the Court stated that, in a suppression hearing, a trial court is to
limit itself "to the objectively ascertainable question [of] whether a reasonably well
trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate's
authorization." 468 U.S. at 922 n.23. Leon thus makes it improper for a trial court
conducting a suppression hearing to inquire into the cognitive state of an officer at
the time he carried out an intrusion. Id.
Were an officer to be asked at a suppression hearing whether he knew at the time
of his intrusion that it was illegal, he could probably resist answering on fifth
amendment grounds because a positive answer would provide the foundation for a
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emphasis on objective reasonableness, expansion of the "good
faith" exception to all warrantless intrusions would lead in a
significant minority of cases to admission of evidence obtained
through deliberate violation of the law.
Finally, it should be noted that an extension of the "good
faith" exception concedes defeat on a point where no concession is necessary. As we have suggested, the concession that
must be made where the rules of search and seizure are
involved is that there is an uneliminable margin of error as to
the legality of warrantless intrusions. We have noted, though,
that there does not appear to be any single type of intrusion
in which extensively trained officers are more likely than not
to be mistaken about the law. And one can add to this the
fact that with extensive training, officers display knowledge of
fourth amendment law that is roughly the same as that of
prosecutors and defense lawyers. Establishment of a "good
faith" exception would reduce the incentive for departments to
offer, and for officers to undertake, extensive training in the
law. Such training is critical to bringing officers toward
compliance with the law. Assuming that the Court wishes to
avoid the problem of foregone legal intrusions associated with
direct sanctions, while maintaining its commitment to
protecting the dignitary interests implicated by the rules of
search and seizure, it can do so only by rejecting adoption of
a general extension of the "good faith" exception.

V. CONCLUSION

Deterrence operates through the communication to an
individual of a threat of unpleasant consequences if the
individual engages in a prohibited act. In using this definition
of deterrence we have drawn on our findings about the police

criminal prosecution. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1988) (establishing criminal liability
for willful deprivations of constitutional rights by those acting under color of law).
Furthermore, a positive answer would expose an officer to civil liability under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), despite the objective reasonableness test employed in qualified
immunity defenses. See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,341 (1986) (stating that
qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law"). Even if it were constitutionally permissible, then, to ask an officer
at a suppression hearing whether he knew his intrusion to be illegal, it would be
counterproductive to do so because an officer who had known his intrusion to be
illegal when carryingit out would be unlikely to respond truthfully to such a question.
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to point to one limitation on deterring illegal searches and
seizures that would be encountered by any device employed to
discourage illegal intrusions and to point to another limitation
that is peculiar to the exclusionary rule. The general limitation is police officers' inability to identify what the law
prohibits. Our findings indicate that even extensively trained
officers (as well as prosecutors and defense lawyers) are
mistaken about a quarter of the time about the lawfulness of
intrusions governed by specific rules of search and seizure.
The exclusionary rule's limitation is its indirect effect on police
officers. Given its weak deterrent effect, it is not surprising
that about half the officers we surveyed indicated they would
carry out an intrusion they believed to be illegal in at least
one of the scenarios described in our questionnaire.
The policy implications of these findings, we have suggested,
should be reviewed from two perspectives-by thinking about
the findings' significance for the exclusionary rule in general
and about their significance for an across-the-board "good
faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. As for the first point,
we have argued that exclusion's weakness is in fact one of its
strengths; although direct sanctions are needed to discourage
deliberate police illegality, the complexity of the rules of
search and seizure makes it appropriate for only exclusion to
be used to promote adherence to those rules. As for the latter
point, our findings provide strong reasons for not adopting a
general "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. In the
first place, our findings indicate that once officers receive
extensive training in the law, they are correct more often than
they are mistaken even on questions involving specific rules
of search and seizure. Second, assuming the Court's current
test of objective reasonableness would be employed in assessing the admissibility of evidence under a general exception to
the exclusionary rule, the admission of evidence would be
secured in a significant minority of cases through deliberate
police illegality. And third, given the success training has had
in improving officers' knowledge of the law, there is no reason
to concede defeat as far as the rules of search and seizure are
concerned. The answer instead is for the courts to continue to
employ incentives that encourage the expansion of police
training programs.

